Operators On The State-owned Commercial Banks Pay And Performance Relationship

Salary system as the basic enterprise incentive system is related to banking business and improve corporate governance structure and operating performance to improve directly. As a corporate control operator, whose income is reasonable or not will decide whether he work hard to meet the business owners'need to increase enter-Pries efficiency or not. This is also the root cause of the incentive and restrictive mec-hanism. Western scholars'study including the income of operators between corporate performance, managerial compensation and the size of the relationship .The relation-ship between government acts , the operators'personal characteristics on the operators, and the impact of their rewards level.Today, China's four major Government-owned commercial banks have completed share-holding reform; the CEO of the Bank's salary level has been widely discussed. In fact, this phenomenon is a Natural phenomenon because the separation of ownership and manage rights. Therefore, build a rational salary system has become the key of state-owned commercial banks reform. It's also have great theoretical significance and application value to their employees, especially the operators. This article began with the problem of how to encourage CEO. Fully consider the characteristics of banking executives in the industry on the issue of different incentives from the Government-owned holding enterprises unique perspective of the salary of its executive incentive problem. This article first introduced the basic theory, the Principal-agent theory, Modern Human Capital theory and the Theory of Classical Economics wages. On this basis, point out the defects in the property rights of Government -owned banks has led to the weakness of incentive pay. Then analyzed the content of hidden income and its impact to Government-owned commercial banks, the impact of incentive pay. By empirical research, investigation the relationship between Payment and performance and hope to take on the banks to further expand. The research done to help build the effective CEO incentives to comply with the current .help Government-owned commercial banks to participate in market competition. Evidence found out in paid money managers associated with the performance of Government-owned listed companies have more correlation than ordinary enterprise, but there is no significant relationship between relative performances. In addition, the result also shows there are no different on sector's equity focus between the banks and general companies, that is to say banks do not reflect unique because of its high debt ratio. Study suggests that, although the banking industry has more comprehensive monitoring mechanism compared to others, but the regulatory effect is not obvious. Finally, we designed a number of recommend-dations basic to the conclusions of empirical analysis on the state-owned commercial banks pay incentives. Recommendations mainly stressed the need to strengthen the CEO's Incentive Compensation Design and the correlation of the performance of Government -owned commercial banks to link to the CEO's pay degree.