Capital Constraint-based Supply Chain Financial Services Research

Cash flow is one of the three inherence parts of supply chain management, but has been ignored in the development of supply chain management. As the urgent need of enterprises financial flow, supply chain finance has been the pursuit in the business, finance and academics."1+N"trade model is the embryonic in the process of supply chain finance development. "1" is the core enterprise of supply chain, "N" is the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The first to do supply chain finance in the domestic, Shenzhen Development Bank, chose the "N", provide financial services to a single business or multiple businesses in industry supply chain. It makes the cash flow more liquidity through extending industry chain. The real needs of supply chain finance come from small and medium-sized enterprises. SMEs are constrained to finance.The third party logistics enterprises cooperate with financial institutions and the core enterprise of supply chain to create a new financing model of SME-supply chain finance which provides a new solution for SMEs to get loans. Many kinds of factors such as market uncertainty, information asymmetry will bring the risk of banks to provide financial services. As a new field, the system research is not enough.Based on the inventory financing , this paper first analyze a risk neutral retailer of financial constraints makes the optimal order decisions and consider the relationship between rate and the commodity value, and finally come through setting the pledge rate to reduce the credit risk. Then suppose the retailer is loss aversion , the relation between procurement strategy and the financing decision.In addition, this paper also considers the problem that, with the agent theory, the bank incentives the third party logistics firm to participate the financial service. We get the result that is under the asymmetric information the bank designs incentive mechanism to reduce risk .We get the conclusions: first, banks provide financing services to SMEs by setting a pledge rate to reduce the probability of default or probability of corporate bankruptcy. Second, if the retailer is loss aversion preferences, the retailer's bankruptcy probability will be less than the risk-neutral retailer's bankruptcy probability. Last, in the case of information asymmetry, banks design incentives contract to the logistics business. The greater incentive coefficient makes the greater the logistics effort.