Research On Supply Chain's Ordering And Financing Strategies With Capital Constraint And Loss Aversion

China's SMEs(small and medium enterprises)occupy an important position in the national economy.However,for the smaller SMEs,their own funds are limited,and due to the small amount of guaranteed assets,lack of credit,and high supervision costs.For reasons,it is difficult to obtain financing from third-party financial institutions such as banks.As a result,supply chain finance has become an important means for many small and medium-sized retailers to solve the problem of fund shortages under tight financial conditions and difficulties in financing from financial institutions such as banks.In recent years,the core enterprises have become increasingly aware of the dangers of the security repurchase financing to their own interests.After continuous trials,the core enterprise guarantee financing has gradually emerged as a new type of financing model and has been widely used.With the maturing supply chain finance market at home and abroad,more and more financing modes are appearing in the financial market.However,how to choose the financing mode that maximizes the interests of the company on the basis of considering the actual situation of the enterprise itself is particularly evident.important.Studies have shown that most decision makers do not meet the “reasonable economic man” hypothesis proposed in neo-classical economics in the decision-making process,but have a behavior of loss avoidance.This paper uses a two-stage supply chain system composed of one supplier and one retailer as the research object.Based on the newsvender model,the paper adopts the Stackelberg game method.This paper studies the ordering and pricing strategies for the supply chain under the core enterprise guarantee financing mode,financing mode selection strategy with a capital-restraint retailer,and also supply chain decision-making and financing strategy selection based on the loss aversion under prospect theory.The main research content is as follows:When the market demand is random,a total expected profit maximization model for supplier,retailer,and supply chain is established,the optimal wholesale price of supplier and optimal order quantity of the retailer under centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making is given in the core corporate guarantee financing mode.With the benefit sharing contract,it can coordinate the supply chain profits under two kinds of decisions.We can obtain the conclusion that the core enterprise guarantee financing model can create new value for the supply chain.The supply chain's choice of financing model was considered between trade credit and core enterprise guarantee financing mode.The ordering,pricing,and supply chain benefits under the two models were compared.The results show that when the financing conditions are different,the financing model of the enterprise is different,too.When the market demand is random,the fluctuation of market demand will also have an impact on the outcome of the choice of corporate financing model.When considering the behavior of retailers' loss aversion,the paper analyzes the decision of supply chain at the random demand of market,and considers the impact of the supply chain financing mode decision-making when the retailer has different initial capital and loss aversion degree.The research results show that the retailer's loss aversion behavior will have different degrees of influence on the decision-making and income of each party in the supply chain.