Researches On The Operational And Financial Decisions Of The Supply Chain With Financial Constraints

With the development of economic globalization and intensive market competition,the uncertainty extends from the demand side to the supply side,which is a huge challenge for supply chain management.Many enterprises,especially those small and medium firms,often face the limited working capital in operation,which prevents them from making optimal production and procurement decisions.In the presence of liquidity constraints,firms need short-term financing to execute their procurement actions.However,the existing researches on supply chain finance pay less attention to the credit rating of loan enterprises,especially using the fixed assets as a measurement is even rarer.On the other hand,many studies with respect to the supply reliability only focus on matching the supply and demand,but insufficiently consider the influence of capital flow.With the practices of the current supply chain financing modes,this paper mainly focuses on studying some financial problems faced by the firms in practice,and the specific research works are as followsIn the first part,we study the selection strategy of supply chain financing modes based on the retailer's trade grade.In the two-echelon supply chain financing(SCF)system composed of a capital-constrained retailer,a supplier and a commercial bank,we characterize two different limited financing modes(internal financing and external financing)based on the retailer's collateral assets.A newsvendor-like retailer has a single opportunity to order goods from a supplier to satisfy future uncertain demand.In the presence of bankruptcy risk for the retailer,we figure out their strategic interaction as a Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader and analyze the optimal decisions for each participant.Regardless of the choice of financing mode is chosen,the capital-constrained retailer orders fewer goods if the financing cost is relatively high.In addition,when the market demand obeys the uniform distribution,if the retailer possesses more collateral assets,he will enjoy a lower loan interest rate and increase order quantity gradually.Moreover,compared with the internal financing mode,each participant obtains the larger expected profits under the external financing modeIn the second part,we study the ordering and subsidizing strategies for loss-averse retailer under dual-sourcing.In the previous researches,risk aversion of supply chain enterprises is often neglected in order to simplify the model.This part examines the problem which a risk-averse retailer places orders from two upstream suppliers.One supplier is reliable but the price is high,another supplier is unreliable but the price is low.However,the latter's supply unreliability can be mitigated by the way of advanced payment provided by the retailer.Based on this,this paper constructs an order model for procuring from a reliable supplier,an unreliable supplier and two suppliers respectively.The result shows that the retailer is able to achieve greater expected utility under dual souring.Moreover,it is possible for the retailer to order more products from an unreliable supplier but fewer products from a reliable supplier as the proportion of advanced payment increases under dual souring.This study also further explores the impact of factors such as loss aversion and demand fluctuation on retailer's optimal strategy under dual souring.In the third part,we study who should subside the innovation of an unreliable supplier with limited capital.The enterprises in the supply chain are more vulnerable to supply risks under global procurement trend.In order to reach a win-win situation.Many downstream firms are willing to provide subsidies for suppliers to help them improve supply reliability.However,many suppliers cannot satisfy the order because of the constrained production cost and are in need of short-term financing.We model their strategic interaction as a Stackelberg game with the retailer as the leader On the one hand,he will provide free subside for the supplier to improve the supply reliability,on the other hand,the supplier can borrow money from buyer or bank to solve insufficient production cost.The final results reveal the supplier prefer to choose bank finance since the risk-free interest rate provided by bank is lower than buyer's interest rate.Interestingly,when the investment cost is low,the retailer has the incentive to increase supply reliability to 100%.At the same time,the wholesale price decided by the retailer is lower compared with the situation of high investment cost.Moreover,this study also concludes that the increase in market potential has a positive effect on the expected profits of all participants.