Macarthur About The Korean War And The U.s. Government Strategic Differences

When the Korean War broke out, American government and military force with their cold-war ideology came to the conclusion that the Korean War was wire-pulled by the Soviet Union as part of its global expansion scheme, which American should strike back with great determination. But as far as the global strategic pivot was concerned, Truman and MacArthur diverged. MacArthur believed the strategic pivot was Asia-Pacific region. If the communist aggression in Asia was defeated, then European security would be ensured. As a result, MacArthur wanted to put the war on a larger scale, even at the cost of a comprehensive war with China and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the Truman Administration firmly held the strategic pivot was Europe. Therefore America could not get trapped in Korea, let alone a war with China, or America would be unable to resist the Soviet Union's aggression in Europe. The divergence in strategic pivot resulted in uncompromising divergence in war objectives and relations with Taiwan. This caused MacArthur's dismissal and China's involvement in the war. The Korean War developed from a civil war to an international regional war mainly between China and America. The strategic divergence also produced profound impact on American domestic politics and American relations with its allies.The thesis falls into three parts. The first part deals with the breaking out of the Korean War and American military interference in the Korean War as a background. Toward the end of WWII, the Soviet Union and America occupied the Korean Peninsula respectively and launched a diplomatic fight around the 38 latitude, which finally split Korea. With the Soviet Union's support Kim Il-sung founded Democratic People's Republic of Korea while Syngman Rhee supported by America founded republic of Korea. The 38 latitude became the"legitimate"boundary of the two independent political entities. The Koran War resulted from both the Soviet Union-America diplomatic fight around the 38 latitude and the military confrontation between the South Korea and the North Korea.Before the Korean War, Europe ranked the first in American global strategy, so America withdrew its power in East Asia. America adopted a non-military interference policy toward Korea and a"let it be"policy toward China, an attempt to alienate China and the Soviet Union. When China's issue was finally settled, Truman Administration's diplomatic policy was severely criticized. The Korean War served as a timely opportunity for Truman to adjust his strategy in East Asia, as a result of which American immediately dispatched its troops to Korea and the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan Strait.The second part as the main strength of the thesis analyzes the strategic divergence in the Korean War between MacArthur and the Truman Administration mainly in the perspectives of the scale and objective of American interference in the war, Taiwan policy and American global strategic pivot. American government's objective of the Korean War underwent a process of transformation. Prior to China's entering the war, American government's objective changed from resuming what the Korean Peninsula was to unifying the peninsula. The change was made because American government believed that the Soviet Union and China would not intervene, and that American troops might end the war soon. A quick victory meant the initiative for the Truman Administration in domestic politics, so the Truman Administration risked changing its original strategic objective. When China entered the war, American government's objective was resumed to a regional war. For one thing, America suffered from a heavy military loss. For another, America did not want to be at a comprehensive war with China, because being trapped in Asia might give the Soviet Union an opportunity in Europe. In addition, its European allies exerted great pressure on American government. On the other hand, MacArthur held an unchanging position to destroy the North Korea and tried to extend the war to China's territory even at the cost of a comprehensive war with China and the Soviet Union. The divergence in Taiwan policy was as follows. MacArthur attached great importance to Taiwan's military value, demanding to support Chiang Kai-shek whom MacArthur tried to involve in the Korean War. But the Truman Administration rejected MacArthur's position fearing that Chiang Kai-shek's involvement in the Korean War might result in a comprehensive war with communist China. The strategic divergence in the Korean War between MacArthur and the Truman Administration was, in essence, the divergence in American global strategic pivot. MacArthur believed that the final fight against communism would be in Asia rather than in Europe, for being defeated by communism in Asia would inevitably result in a European loss. On the contrary, the Truman Administration believed that Europe was the major battlefield of East-West confrontation, so America could not be long trapped in Asia.The third part deals with the impact produced by the strategic divergence in the Korean War between MacArthur and American government. The divergence directly resulted in MacArthur's dismissal and influenced the course of the war. Besides, it caused China's entering the war, and developed the Korean War from a civil war in the Korean peninsula into an international regional war. The publicity of the divergence caused more criticism from the opposition on Truman's Koran policy and a popular misunderstanding of government's Koran policy. It also damaged Truman's image and caused a sharp fall of the Truman Administration's validity among the people. When China entered the war, American government's decision to limit the war to Korea was welcomed by its allies. But MacArthur publicly defied government's decision. As the top commander, his words breached the unity and trust between America and its allies, which produced negative influence on the relations between America and its allies.