Soviet espionage in the United States, 1945 to 1953 and the response of the Truman Administration

Soviet intelligence successfully penetrated American defense industries, the Manhattan Project, and American government during the Second World War and into the postwar era. Yet as this thesis argues warnings by Soviet defectors and informants within the Communist Party went largely ignored by the American government including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Soviet defections in 1946, and the realization that Communist spies had acquired America's most closely guarded secret, the atomic bomb, compelled the FBI and the rest of the American counter intelligence community to respond in order to determine the extent to which American security had been compromised. As a result of these investigations and subsequent revelations, it was at last understood that Soviet intelligence had penetrated the American government. Yet it is the contention of this thesis that even after the extent of Soviet espionage became known to some degree, the Truman Administration appears to have either not take the warnings seriously or responded by downplaying the threat. Previous scholarship has not addressed what Truman knew or why he failed to act when apprised of the true threat posed by Soviet intelligence. Investigation of primary source documents indicates that President Truman was made aware of the threat and extent of Soviet espionage by late 1946. The available evidence suggests that he chose to treat it as a political and government loyalty issue.