Tarski: Semantic Theory Of Truth In Accordance With Theory

Whether Tarski's theoy of semantic truth is one of correspondence, since Popper's positive answer for it was subjected to criticism, has been a problem much contested.Up to now, according to their opinions,two opposite positions emerged on this issue:Karl Popper and his followers on the one side and those who argue against Popper on the other.Tarski's distinction between object-language and meta-language, according to Popper, ensures that the theory of semantic truth is a correspondence theory. In order to demonstrate that, Popper applied the convention T.The two aspects of Popper's arguments, however, had received criticisms.Richard C.Jennings believed that Popper's apprehension of the distinction between object-language and meta-language is inconsistent with Tarski's intention. Susan Haack, on the other hand, focused her criticism on Popper's application of convention T, and based on that, she concluded that the theory of semantic truth is not a correspondence theory.Haack's arguments captivated many with its'mathematical rigor. Popper and his supporters have not yet given a forceful refutation of it, and we believe that they could never offer such a refutation. Therefore, we agree with Haack that the distinction between meta-language and object-language is no guarantee that the theory of semantic truth is a correspondence theory. However, Haack's further conclusion that the theory of semantic truth is not a correspondence theory could not be adequately corroborated by her argument about convention T.Two things should demonstrate this point:Firstly, we don't think that Haack's arguments about convention T are conclusive, and there is room for further scrutiny. This analysis brings to light other aspects of truth definition and the relation between correspondence theory and other theories like coherence theory.And, as a consequence, it has a heavey bearing upon how convention T should be taken.Secondly, a further investigation should suffice to prove that Tarski's theory of semantic truth is one of correspondence.The reason for that conclusion, different from those Popper offered, is the recursive definition of 'satisfaction'. Our thesis also faces some difficulties.Actually, since the concept of satisfaction is a semantic one, if one wants to define the concept of truth via the concept of satisfaction, he is bound to case deep into the relation between the theory of meaning and the theory of truth.It is on this point that Davidson's argument turns its back to Tarski's intention, and consequently we need to offer a reply to Davidson's criticism.Apart from the afore-mentioned theoretical debates,part of the reasons responsible for such a good burst of academic disputes are due to some statements of Tarski himself.People of opposite positions on the same question all quote Tarski to support their theses, but does it signal that Tarski contradicts himself in his paper? This thesis also probes into this question and we conclude at last that the answer to it is definitely nagetive.