Research On The System Of Directors' De - Appointment In China Taiwan Region Co., Ltd

Taiwan, China Law "director nomination system", after paragraph 1 of Article 192 of the four provisions "nominee corporate shareholder or on behalf of persons, and shall submit the registration of basic data and corporate shareholders held proof of the amount of shares. " Thus, the directors nominees include corporate shareholders and representatives included, this provision but it echoes the first to recognize the legal director of the Law 27 willing, therefore, this paper considers it necessary to start directors qualify for argument, Director-owned club scene is limited to whether a natural person, or corporate shareholders elected a director no harm. Exploring the question of the legal qualifications of directors, due to the company law has expressly provided in Article 27, the legal basis swim seemingly no problem, but the provision is itself problematic, there is always controversy Abolishment.The emergence of a system must have its origin, and the operating system it’s necessary because when the local conditions, so that to achieve "Law and rpm accountability, governance and the world should be active," the situation. For a system there are positive and negative two views more below normal. When a system has been criticized as being outdated, its existence being questioned, it is necessary to conduct a thorough review of the disputed system, from the formation of the system of background, development process, and other positive and negative arguments one by one analysis, it was decided the future of the System. Accidents, this paper is taken as described above, to reflect the appropriateness of existing corporate directors and legal representative director System.Directors propose legislation qualifications. Taiwan, China Corporation Law Article 27, paragraph 1, provisions that allow corporate shareholders elected directors, therefore, director nominees may be not only natural, it can also be a corporate shareholder. However, the validity of the current article for corporate directors and legal representative director System has questioned that such a system will not be set up bedstead house knot, the concerns of conflict of interest under thepartnershipmoredualappointment,therefore,thispaperclaimsqualificationofdirectorsshouldbelimitedtonaturalpersons,corporatedirectorsareprohibited.inaddition,directorselectedrepresentativeinthecaseofcorporateshareholdersofthefaction,whichtheyderivedfromthelegalissues,notonlycreatedifficultiesattributabletothesubjectofthejudgmentonthepracticaloperationoftherightsandobligations,butalsopotentialconflictsofinterestunderthedualappointmentofrelationshipinevitable.thereforeinthispaperthatthecompanyintaiwan,chinaarticle27,paragraph2,representativeofthelegalprovisionsofthelegislationofshareholderselecteddirectors,therearereconsiderednecessary.nextisthedesigndirectornominationforelectivesystem.thepremiseoftheelectionofdirectors,directorcandidatesmusthaveapresence,andthatishowthedirectorcandidatesisthekey.therehasalwaysbeentheboardofdirectorshandedoveralistofcandidatesproposedpassiveshareholdervote,butthepossibilityofshareholderstoactivelyparticipateinthedecisionofthedirectorcandidates,generateshareholderdisputewhetherthenominationofdirectors.becauseofchina’staiwanregion,legislationpassedearlyin2005, "directornominationsystem",therefore,therighttonominateshareholderinthecountryiswidespreadconsensus.butamendingthelawhasbeenforseveralyears,toamendthestatuteusesapubliccompanydirectorcandidatesnominatedbythedirectorsgeneralelectionsystem,veryfew,althoughthelawitselfconceptionofgoodness,butnotthecompanywelcomesitisanindisputablefact.theboardappointedsystemdesign:theappointmentofdirectorsandthecompanyisaspecialrelationship,arelationshipoftrust,whentheresolutionoftheshareholderssolutionsdirector,saidbothpartieswhenmutualtrustbasisdoesnotexist,therefore,china’staiwanregionalcorporationlawallowsshareholderswithoutreasonappointeddirectors,onlyfortheprotectionofattheexpirationofthetermofofficeoftheentrustinc.thenormalexpectation,andgivesthesolutionofanydamagesufferedunwarrantedclaimright,thenthenormalsolutionsdirector,reasonisuncertainlegalconcept,shouldberegardedasthevaluejudgmentofcasetobespecific,bypracticaloperationofcumulativetype,andtheuncertaintheconnotation,thelegalconceptofmeticulous.basicallyistocontinuewiththedirectorsperformtheirdutiesuntiltheendofhisterm,onwhetherthecompanyhasnopossibilitytobreak.referencetogermanlawprovidesthreeexamplesof "matters",whichmeanstheseriousbreachofduty,unabletoperform,thelossoftheshareholders’ meetingisusuallythebusinesstrust.thispaperarguesthatinspecificcases,inadditiontothemajorissueswithoutmajordamagethecompanyinviolationoflaworthearticlesofassociationexecutivedirectortoconsiderthebusiness,alsoneedtocompromisebetweentheappointmentofdirectorsisaviolationofthecompany’sboardofdirectors,andisobviouslynotsuitableforthejudgmentstandardofcompetence,asajustificationoftheremovalofdirectors.asfortheresolutionoftheshareholders’ meetingtovotethewaysolutionsdirector,althoughthecurrentcompanylawadoptedaspecialresolution,butthispaperfocusesonthetaiwanregionalcorporationdirectorselectedbyordinaryresolutioninchinaattendedthethresholdaccordingtothearticle198 thcumulativevotingelected,theelectionofdirectorsasphasewhenloosewayisquiteloose;incontrast,whytheshareholders’ meetingdirectorsneedtosetmorestringentresolutionmethodresolution?iftheboardofdirectorshaslostitsmajorityshareholderconfidence,replacingtheoldwiththenewpublicopinionpolls,whynot!orfortheminorityshareholdersthroughtheaccumulationofthecumulativevotingelecteddirectors,byordinaryresolutiontodismissaviolationoflaw,theprotectionofminorityshareholders.thispaperistoapprove,americaforcumulativevotingelecteddirectorspecialprovisionsasset;overall,sincetheboardiselectedinthecumulativevotingsystem,votingsolutionsdirectorsincethecalculation,thesamewaythataccumulatedintheticketsystem,astomakethesolutionelectionoftheelectionweightagainstthedirectors,thedirectorsshallnothaveanysolution.asaresult,theappointmentanddismissalofthethresholdandtheresolutionnotonlyinthesystemhavebeenmade,aretheordinaryandcalculatethenumberofvotingrightsatthethresholdaccordingtothecumulativevotingsystem,itcanimplementthelegalprotectionofminorityshareholdersof.inaddition,ifbeappointeddirectorwiththeidentityoftheshareholders,inthefaceofaresolutionoftheshareholders’ meeting,theboardofthesolution,notneedtoabstainfromvoting.moreover,thispaperadvancetheelectionofalldirectorsmusthaveadirectorwhoisbasedontheeffectoftheposition,notonlythattheresolutionshouldbeconsistent,andthatthearticle199thofthe1 asadvancesolutionsdirector,wasquotedin199thafterparagraphfirstfordamagecompensation,itgoeswithoutthecivilcodeprovisionsforimpairmentofappointmentcompensation.evenso,china’sregionalcorporationintaiwanforaresolutionoftheshareholders’ meetingsolutionsdirectorexpressly199 thgoldsinglesection,fortheprotectionofthedirectoristhesolution,onlytheinnocentwhoenjoytherightofclaimfordamages.inthispaper,basedonthedevelopmentofforeignlegislationandpracticaloperation,protectthepropositionteamintaiwanareaofourcountrysolutionsdirector,shouldnotonlyremedythepipeline,suchastherequestfordamagesfortherevocationoftheresolutionoftheshareholders’ meetingoraction,butalsoadvancetheproceduralsafeguards,suchastheboardofdirectorsshallbebychancedueprocessoflaw,tothecomprehensiveprotectionoftherightsandinterestsofdirectorsisthesolution,andlettheshareholdersdecidewhethertodismissthedirector’sdecisioninthefullinformation.