China's State-owned Commercial Banks, Credit Action

In the first chapter, this paper define the loan behavior of commercial banks as some kind of contract under the market condition, then provides its five premises. Furthermore, it performs a academic deduction econometrically by a monopolized market structure model, in terms of both free interest rate and constricted interested rate, from which conclusion is drawn that, also proved by loan rationing theory in various aspects, if there is complete information, loan contract will be helpful to transfer risks.Chapter 2 is concentrated on China's Stated-owned commercial banks. Through the positive analyses on its loan behaviors, it discovers two features: the deflated credit amount and the bi-dimension separated market, which is harmful to convey China's Monetary police delivery, to Financial media Functions, to promote monopoly and increase bank's systematic risks.Chapter 3 interprets the reasons why China's Stated-owned banks are presenting the behaviors above in four angles-Information Structure, Legal Environment, Internal Management and Property Institution.The last Chapter suggests some countermeasures based on analyses above. They are : Establish an information-shared system; Consummate related legal system and decrease its executive cost level; Establish an internal incentive mechanism in banks; Promote the stock-holding system reform of china's state-owned commercial banks...