State Enterprises, Incentive And Restraint Mechanisms

The stated-owned enterprises (SOE) are the backbone of the development of national economy of China. The magnificence of their efficiency and favorable development to the establishment of the market economy, the development of national economy, and development of the reform and opening to the outside world of China speaks itself. For a long time, the issues concerned with SOE have always been not in the fields of economics and management. The guide of a theoretical system, which conforms to the situation of China and the characteristics of SOE, is urgently needed. At present, the reform of SOE aims to establish modern enterprise system and to rebuild SOE into standardized corporations according to the principal of "explicitness of property right, definitude of obligation and right, separation of government and enterprises, and scientific management". The corporation system of modern enterprise is the agency-principal system based on the separation between ownership and managing right. In this thesis, the methods of comparison research, qualitative analysis and the combination of positive philosophy and standardized research, the theories of economics and management are used to make systematic and comprehensive analysis of the agency-principal system of SOE based upon the research results of the theories and the borrowing and absorbing the advanced thoughts of the theories of modern agency -principal system of the western countries according to Characteristics of China's enterprises and situations of China, and to make a deep and detailed research of the key issues of the incentive and restriction mechanism of operators. The thesis includes four parts:First, the analysis and evaluation of the actuality of incentive and restriction of operators are made. By exampling some corruption cases, we know the circs that thoughtless decision-making, devouring public money, shifting capital is so severe, and by some investigations, we learn that there are many questions need to be resolved, such as selecting managers, devising salary structure, supervision andmanagement.Second, the comparison between the agency-principal of China's SOE and that of corporation of the western countries is made and the difference between the agency-principal relation-ship of SOE and that of the western countries are analyzed. Then the cause of the incentive and restriction issues of SOE is deeply researched.Third, aiming at the questions and shortage, the comprehensive governance structure of the combination of material incentive and spiritual incentive, internal supervision mechanism and external supervision mechanism of enterprises is set forth, and its qualitative analysis is made.Fourth, the matters we should make clear during the course of improving the incentive and restriction mechanism are set up, and also point out the issue yet to be studied.