| As known, the enterprises in our country, state-owned ones in particular operate with inadequate efficiency, vigor and competitive capability as a whole. On the issue of low efficiency of state-owned enterprises, professors, scholars and management department professionals have been concentrating their efforts on the probe of the causes and interrelated countermeasures to deal with it. However, in the author's opinion, the problem lies in the lacking of conditions, soil and environment appropriate for managers of state-owned enterprises to develop their full potentials, instead of the lacking of renowned and competent enterprise managers. To resolve this matter, the high priority should be put on the construction of the management groups of state-owned enterprises, opportunities endowed for excellent managers to reveal their talents and the incompetent ones to withdraw from the scenario. To accomplish this goal, emphasis should be put on the establishment of the efficient executive incentive and restriction mechanism of managers.Through the combination of primarily mature incentive and restriction theory at present and the public property right of our national state-owned enterprises, this thesis focuses on the analytical research of the present situation and problems encountered by the executive incentive and restriction mechanism of the state-owned enterprises, in an attempt to present a structure of thought with theoretical and empirical value for the executive incentive and restriction mechanism of the state-owned enterprises in our nation. The author points out that Executive Stock Option (ESO) is a significant measure to solve the problem of the inadequate incentives ofour national state-owned enterprises at present and puts forward a practical modeled implementation strategy through the comparative analysis of various executive and restriction strategies.The basic train of thought, major contents and viewpoints of the thesisExecutive incentive is studied through theoretical and empirical analysis in the thesis. The train of thought is presented as follows:Firstly, the relevant executive incentive theories are described and analyzed to seek theoretical supports for the incentive problem of state-owned enterprises with public property right. Then, the problems are detected and boiled down through the analysis of its present situation to put forward fairly practical strategies and measures. Finally, empirical analyses are presented to demonstrate the feasibility and accuracy of the presented strategies.In accordance with this train of thought, the thesis is composed of four sections.In section one, the executive incentive theories at home and abroad are evaluated comprehensively and the viewpoints of the author are illustrated in an attempt to form the theoretical foundation for the thesis to further study the executive incentive and restriction of the state-owned enterprises as a whole; trust and agency theory, ERG theory, and multi-leveled trust and agency theory according to the practices of Chinese state-owned enterprises, and the relative theory of the control power. Part One of this section concentrates on the executive incentive and restriction theories of western countries, i.e. the introduction and inducement of trust and agency theory. Firstly, this theory is described in details, after which the mechanism of the agency issues of the trust agency is analyzed. Besides that, the main contents of the ERG theory are also introduced. In the second part, the multi-leveled trust agency issue ofChina's state-owned enterprises under the condition of public ownership is discussed. The first level trust agency is the "authorized chain from the original trustor to the national power center", while, the second level is the "authorized chain from the national power center to the original trustor". Among them, the government plays the key role, connecting the double systems; because it is not only the agent of the original trustor, but also the trustor of the final agent. |
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