Study On The Incentive-Restrain Mechanism Of Manager's Action On The Principal-Agency Relationship--An Analysis Of Game Theory On Managers Of State Enterprises

Manager will always pursuit for maximum of his own utility function, avoid risk and be lack of risky spirit, so it will be contrary to the motivation that nominating him. Generally, managers in China are not real vocational managers, a perfect institutional environment be propitious to bringing vocational manager into existence, motivating him and endow him with corresponding right and obligation still haven't came into being in state enterprises. Under this condition, it is important and necessary to run a effective institution which can make managers share profit and risk with shareholders.Existing domestic researches have thrown light on how to set up the motivation institution aiming at normal employee. Based on the former research, firstly this paper will put forward the hypothesis of motivation and restriction institution of vocational managers by researching on the manager revolution resulted from the separate of ownership and operation. We will chiefly research on several problems as following, firstly we will discuss how to motivate the vocational managers through a game model. Secondly, it will enter the discussion about characters and reasons of the state enterprise manager's action, and we will set up the model about action choice of state enterprise managers. Thirdly, we will take a railway enterprise as a case, discuss how to keep the managers away from adopting the choice of morality risky action.