Problem Research, State Enterprises, Incentive And Restraint

This essay is divided into four parts. The first part is a general introduction, I develop the main idea from the necessity and possibility of motivation and restriction. First, the essay points out: modern corporation's relationship of authorize has "substitution jam", this makes the deputy not only increase its ability, but also has chance to do two kind of things to harm the client: one is moral venture, the other one is converse choice. The core problem which originates of this is solution of motivation, restriction of the converse choice, and avoidance of moral snare. In another word, the client want the deputy can work for their benefit, but they cannot achieve this through compel contract the "force" the deputy to follow the client's will. Therefore they can only "lure" them to follow this by motivation and restriction. Therefore it's necessary for clients to motivate and restrict, and this essay is just focus on the necessity of motivation and restriction. The second part of the general introduction is to explain the possibility of motivation and restriction. I believe it is possible to carry out motivation and restriction. The clients and the deputies' interest is combines with the development of the corporation .Though the maximum of the corporation value is the final target of the clients, the deputy also want to benefit from the management of the corporation. Moreover, this portion also points out that only when the motivation and restriction combined together, it is efficiency. Only an efficient motivation and restriction system can realize the harmony of clients and deputies.The first part of the body is about four problems which come from the national enterprises' authorize relationship, and analyze the main eight problems which originate from the situation of national enterprises' motivation and restriction. And on this basis, I points out the problem we have to resolve if we want to improve the situation of our national enterprises' motivation and restriction, and order a basis forthe choice of national enterprises' motivation and restriction's pattern which is mentioned later.The second part of this essay is the core part, and also reflects this essay's point of view. First, the I made a summary of the definition of the annually salary system and the reason why it come to china so late, then, the I pointed out that, we cannot give up annually salary system just because the condition is not sufficient, conversely, just because the condition is not sufficient, we have to have a try, in order to deepen innovation, summarize experiences through experiments, and finally, prepare some necessary condition for the expansion of annually salary system.As well, I discuss it concretely from nine topics as follows: the body and object of annual salary, annual salary's basic contents and standards, the grinding of it with correlative risk guarantee, position consuming, monitoring and matching reforming actions. At last, I draw my conclusion: incentive methods of annual salary suit managers of china's state owned enterprises.Finally, at the third part, more steps are addressed for the second one. I think the mode of annual salary plus incentive stock is a new mechanism. It can not only be collide with annual salary and stock but also consider the short and long term incentive ways. In this part, I select stock option and selective stock, the double methods of incentive and present their character and definition, and analyze its effects. In the end, I point out the coming predicament and the necessary restrictions.