On To Improve The Corporate Governance Structure Of China's State-owned Commercial Banks

The dissertation focuses on legal means which can be taken to improve the unsatisfactory state of affairs with regard to corporate governance of State-Owned Commercial Banks (hereinafter, SOCBs) in China. Part I introduces fundamental theories on corporate governance of SOCBs, inter alia, the purposive one thereof to be adopted to deal with the subject issue in China, articulating in particular that our proper approach should be contribute to the maximization of interests of all the parties concerned, other than those of shareholders only. After examining systematically the status quo of corporate governance of SOCBs in China, and pointing out afterwards the imperfect points therein, Part II compares the most popular corporate governance styles, which are private shareholder-orientated, manager-orientated or legal person shareholder-orientated one, in terms of their advantages and disadvantages respectively. Consequently, it opines that the third style be selected as the blueprint on which to reform the corporate governance system of SOCBs in China, subject to further appropriate adjustments. Based on current practices relating to corporate governance of SOCBs, and by reference to the successful experiences on the part of the foreign commercial banks, specific legal, administrative, judicial and cultural methods are submitted and discussed in Part III, with a view to a sound solution to the problems investigated above. Noticeably, the three most crucial propositions among them are proposed with in-depth arguments, which are: 1) to reform the current stock structure by introducing strategic investments and effecting Initial Public Offering (IPO); 2) to enhance both the incentive and restrictive functions of the internal corporate governance of SOCBs; and 3) to establish the necessary regulations and optimizing the accompanying elements from the external perspective of corporate governance of SOCBs in our country.