The Influence Of Local Government Expenditure Structure Of Competition On The Supply Of Public Goods

Government competition is a hot issue discussed a lot in recent years,but mostly focuses on tax competition and its influence on the amount of public goods supply, little on expenditure competition and its influence on the pattern of public goods.The study on government competition in China has just started.This essay is going to study competition mechanism and its affects on public goods pattern.The author combines the theory and China's reality,basing on three characters of Chinese local government competition and using qualitative and quantitative analysis to study the influence mechanism of government competition since 1994 on the pattern of public goods supply.The governments compete under different mobility of capital and population, and the lack of "vote with feet" mechanism leads to the preference of public product goods and ignorance of public consumer goods.Chinese unitary political system and appointment system,especially the performance evaluation index system make strong affect on local governments' competition behavior.To get the recognition of higher authority,local government would like to provide those distinct public goods which can fast express explicit performance signal;while on the other hand,those indistinct public goods are under-supply.A large amount of extra-budgetary funds gives local government capital support for their unbalanced public goods supply structure,and this makes the unbalanced structure even worse in poor districts.The author positively analyzing current public goods supply structure which confirms the mechanism analysis above.In consideration of extra-budgetary funds, the positively analysis not only includes the pattern of government budgetary expenditure but also the pattern of public goods.At last,based on the analysis above and three local government competition characters,the author put forward some advices on how to change the unbalanced public goods supply.