Research On Double Channel Supply Chain Game Based On Hotelling Model

Nowadays, with the Internet technology and E-commerce rapid popularization and development, a new dual-channel supply chain consisting of traditional channel and online channel, which is different from traditional single channel supply chain, begins to appear in our field of vision. When the different channels’ conflict and competition problems in dual-channel supply chain becomes more and more prominent, the new supply chain begins to get more and more concerns and attentions from the academia and business.Now, lots of research of dual-channel supply chain is a model which contains manufacturers opening up the direct online channel and traditional retailer channel. But there is little research about online retailer channel and traditional retailer channel component of dual-channel supply chain. So this paper will take “manufacturers & online retailers & traditional retailers” dual-channel supply chain as the research object, considering different psychological preferences of consumers on two different channels, when each supply chain members reach game equilibrium, to explore the variation of product price, market share and profit with the product adaptability of online channel in three cases: the mutual independent members in dual-channel supply chain, manufacturers and traditional retailers alliance, manufacturers and online retailers alliance.This paper shows these conclusions: first, no matter what kind of circumstances, when the model reaching game equilibrium, the product adaptability of online channel will have a negative impact on product price, market share and profit for traditional retailer, but it will have a positive impact on product price, market share and profit for online retailer. Second, for manufacturers, the game optimal equilibrium profit will keep stability, when the members of dual-channel supply chain are mutual independent. The game optimal equilibrium profit will increase in the manufacturer and traditional retailer alliance case. But it will decrease in the manufacturer and online retailer alliance case. Meanwhile, no matter which retailer allies manufacturer, the game optimal equilibrium profit will be higher than the mutual independent case. Third, when the model reaching game equilibrium, if product adaptability of online channel is best, retailers in different channel will be different on product price, market share and profit under different influences.