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Research On Pricing Game Of Multi-channel Supply Chain Under Different Dominance Based On Channel Preference

Posted on:2021-01-22Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:B C YueFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330623475288Subject:Logistics Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the rapid development of e-commerce,the online channel is playing an increasingly important role as a new product sales channel,which has led to many e-commerce platforms.The price of the same product will vary among major e-commerce platforms.The prices of some products are consistent across different online shopping platforms,which makes members of the supply chain system face many major decision-making issues such as channel competition and channel conflicts,and directly affects the interests of members.Therefore,in order to gain advantages in the e-commerce wave,e-commerce companies urgently need to choose the best channel rights structure for planning and management.Based on the theory of linear demand and from the perspective of channel rights and channel preferences,this paper builds a multi-channel supply chain system composed of single-channel retailers(networks)and dual-channel(physical + network)retailers.Multi-channel linear demand function.Using Stackelberg and Bertrand game models,the optimal channel structure for different decisions under the three types of channel rights structure of dual-channel retailer-led(DS),single-channel retailer-led(SS),and two-retailer rights equilibrium(BT)are studied respectively.The selection problem compares and analyzes the influence of customers' online channel preference coefficients on the pricing,sales volume,and profit of the two retailers when the online prices are consistent.Research shows that:(1)In the case of inconsistent online prices,the price and market demand of single-channel retailers 'online channels are not affected by the channel preference coefficient of dual-channel retailers' online channels.If the online prices are consistent,the above situation is the opposite;(2)In the case of inconsistent online prices,the profits of the two retailers are highest under the power structure dominated by the other.If the online prices are the same,the profits of the two retailers are the highest under their own right structure.(3)Regardless of whether the online prices are the same,the dual-channel retailer's pricing decision for the two online and offline channels is the best choice.Under its own power structure.The single channel retailer 's channel pricing decision and selection strategy is different.Only when the online prices are inconsistent,the structure of the rights dominated by itself is optimal.If the online prices are not consistent,the optimal strategy is the right dominated by the other party.structure.
Keywords/Search Tags:channel rights, channel preference, price competition, Stackelberg game, multi-channel supply chain
PDF Full Text Request
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