Research On The Internal Audit Orientation Of State - Owned Enterprises

At present, with the rapid development of China’s economy, the status of the internal audit is gradually improving. Internal audit in enterprise has played a more and more important role in daily operation. But in most of the state-owned enterprises, the internal audit activity and can’t effectively play a role. The author lists the following reasons: first, status and function of internal audit is not clear, the effect is difficult to play. Second, most of the state-owned enterprise internal audit institutions and no independent audit, internal audit department audit object or the same level, or status levels higher than the internal audit department, these cases will affect the independence and authority of the audit. Three, the purpose of the internal audit is not clear, affected by the administrative regulation is more serious.The author from the perspective of social and corporate governance, internal auditing state-owned enterprises is discussed in this position more efficient organization model. First of all, the author cited the social governance and corporate governance, internal audit of the related theory, discuss the similarities and differences of three theories and related areas. Then the author analyzed the state-owned enterprises are the inherent limitations of internal audit; Reveals the "low efficiency, internal audit management to a certain extent, can control of internal audit, internal audit people overstaffed" roots. Since then, the author lists the location of defect state-owned enterprise internal audit in our country, and analyzes the reasons for "internal audit independence is not enough, the power is too small. Finally propose solutions and ideas, that is, draw lessons from Germany corporate governance modes, led by the board of supervisors of internal audit institutions, restricting the interests of all parties.The core idea of this article is: according to the "dilemma" and "the independence" for the main contradiction of the internal audit activity, the author boldly conceived out of the dilemma, draw lessons from Germany mode of double governance structure, improve the fundamental status of internal audit, led by the board of supervisors or directly attributable to the board of supervisors, as the third-party authority of the board and management. And through the rewards and punishment mechanism, stimulate the vitality of internal audit and work efficiency.