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Pricing And Coordination Mechanism Of Electric Business Platform Under The Restriction Of Retailer 's Funds

Posted on:2017-05-04Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y S WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2209330488966490Subject:Business management
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In recent years, the e-commerce develops very quickly and achieves remarkable success. Nevertheless, this problem that retailer don’t have sufficient funding has become a bottleneck for E-commerce platform. The development of. Retailers in E-commerce platform is no exception, the shortage of funds often leads to a lack of inventory phenomenon, which restricts the increase of their sales. Given the high failure rate of small businesses, traditional financial institutions, including the Bank think loans to these retailers is a high-risk. Therefore, it is difficult for retailers to get financial help from banks. In order to the increase of sales and competition for retailers, some giant E-commerce platform have taken actions to provide loans for retailers. The loans that is within 3-6 months and ranging from 1000 to 6000000 US dollars provided by Amazon, which help retailers to increase sales and inventory. Amazon can get earnings from interest on loans and sales. Alibaba and eBay has provide small loans to retailers for promoting consumption before Amazon. Since the service is on-line September 2013, PayPal has provided more than 500 million US dollars loans to the retailers. Jing dong recommend customers which have applied for loans to bank, the retailers can get the line of credit which is based on the cooperation between retailers and Jing dong, the amount of sales, the retailer’s actual operating capacity and other factors. On the background, it is great necessity to research strategies and coordination mechanisms that E-commerce platforms provide loans to retailers.In this paper, the strategies and coordination mechanisms that E-commerce platforms provide loans for retailer is researched under different risk preference. This supply chain is composed of a single retailer and a single E-commerce platform. E-commerce platform is leader, retailer is follower. Facing funding constraints, retailer cannot achieve the optimal order quantity, so the supply chain system cannot get the maximize return. E-commerce platform which is driven by maximize revenue helps retailers solve the problem of lack of funds. Research results is given as below.Research on the strategy and coordination mechanism that the risk-neutral E-commerce platform provide loans for retailer. The study results indicate:revenue sharing contract can make the risk-neutral supply chain coordination. The initial capital of retailer exerts a significant impact on both the loan interest rate and sharing proportion. The initial capital is in direct proportion to both the loan interest rate and sharing proportion. The E-commerce platform can make the loan policy on the basis of the initial capital.Research on the strategy and coordination mechanism that the risk-averse E-commerce platform provide loans for retailer. The study results:revenue sharing contract can make the risk-averse supply chain coordination. The initial capital of retailer, the coefficient of risk aversion of retail and E-commerce platform exert a significant impact on the loan interest rate. Both initial capital and coefficient of risk aversion of the E-commerce platform are is in direct proportion to the loan interest rate.The coefficient of risk aversion of retail is inversely proportional to the loan interest rate. The initial capital is in direct proportion to sharing proportion. So the E-commerce platform can make the loan policy on the basis of the initial capital and the coefficient of risk aversion of participator.The extensive research results presented above not only enrich the theoretical system of supply chain management theory of financing, but also provide theoretical support for the financing decisions which the E-commerce platform and retailer make.
Keywords/Search Tags:The E-commerce platform, Retailer, Capital constraint, Risk preference, Revenue sharing contract
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