Study Of Incentive And Restraint Mechanisms Of Channel Conflict

This paper mainly adopts principal-agent theory to analyses adverseselect and moral hazard problem in marketing channel conflict betweenmanufacture and distributor. It is the purpose of this article that proposesincentives and restrictions mechanism to resolve various kinds of adverseselect and moral hazard problem which are caused by informationasymmetry. This paper emphasizes particularly on micro-level things ofchannel conflict management and adopts relevant theories to analyses andinterpret the typical problem of channel conflict. Finally, the paper proposesincentives and restrictions mechanism for both sides of channel conflict.This article summarizes some disadvantage of current research, andproposes new channel conflict management model and set up channelconflict agent theory model. On the base of agent theory, the paper buildschannel conflict bilateral and multiphase management model to analysesadverse select and moral hazard problem of channel conflict and establishestwo-phase moral hazard model to analyses that how moral hazard risk ofmanufacture and distributor influences by benefits, rewards, sunk costs,extension of agreement and so on. And then, this paper analyses the formingmechanisms of channel conflict and discusses the conditions of channelcooperation base on principal and model of Game theory. At last, the articleillustrates the conclusion through a case analysis of QZ machine group.