A Study Of The Problem Of Principal-agency Based Upon The Game Theory And The Information Economics

Venture Capital took its source at the Valley Silicon of U.S.A. in the nineteen forties. It isnot only a new means of financing and investment, but also a fresh institutional arrangement. Asthe outcome of the innovation of our financial system, its great contribution to the developmentof economy and the pullulation of technological industry has already been confirmed whether intheory or by practice.During the process of Venture Capital, there are two pairs of game: the asymmetricalinformation. Between the Venture Capital person and the Venture Capital company, and theasymmetrical information. Between the Venture Capital company and the Venture corporation.The appearance of them lead to the problem of Adverse Select of the client and the MoralHazard of the attorney, which ultimately result in the short of market efficiency and the limit ofthe Venture Capital development.The first chapter of the paper is the introduction which introduce the investigate background, thecontent, the meaning, and the research method of it. The scholar's investigation summarizeabout the principle-agency of Venture Capital is in the end of this part. The second partintroduces the concept of Venture Capital and it's developed condition firstly, and then analyzesthe macro problem existing in our country now. The third part shows the way to establish themodel of principal agency and introduces the principal agency model between Venture Capitalcompany and Venture Capital person particularly. Fourthly, it analyses the inspirit affection ofthe investors' observation about the variable factor and so on. The fifth part analyses the latentinspirit affection to the expert of Venture Capital getting from the report model of the marketand the market of manager. The above two chapter mainly solve the problem of Venture Capitalexperts' Moral Hazard. To overcome the issue of Adverse Select the sixth part designs an abilityevaluate system for the Venture Capital expert and makes an applying investigation about it. Theseventh part, the summing-up of this article, point out that the low efficiency of Venture Capitalin our country should mainly due to the comparatively short of inspirit mechanism. Manyapparent inspirit mechanism, such as the compare of relatively achievement among them and thesubsection of investment;all have great-inspired effect for the Venture Capital expert.Depending on the time to resolve the problem of Moral Hazard is a latent inspirit method withlow cost. In addition, we can use a series of ability estimating system to overcome the problemof Adverse Select. The innovated points of this article and the aspect of particular investigationare pointed out in the end.