Empirical Analysis Of Control Over The Transfer Of Listed Companies And Corporate Governance Relations

Recently, corporate governance is one of disputed focus in academic fields. Because of the separation between ownership and managing right, it causes the disagreement on the company goal between owner and manager, so agency-principal problem becomes the key of corporate governance.Corporate governance system is the unity of two mechanisms. One is internal control mechanism, including shareholders conference, the directorate, the board of supervisors, and the encouragement and restriction mechanism of managers. The other is external control mechanism, including market for corporate control and market of manager. From the relative studies of the relationship between M&A and corporate governance, we know the market for corporate control plays an important role as external control mechanism. It is the most efficient way to solve the agency problem, and has significant effect on corporate governance.The particularity of domestic listed companies causes the particularity of corporate governance. Although domestic listed companies have set up the shareholders conference, the boards and the board of supervisors, these systems are superficial mostly. The boards is not only formalistic, but also a tool for big shareholders to control the listed company. Actually, manager market in external control mechanism is not come into being in our country, and stock market can not supervise manager yet. So, there must be very serious limitation in corporate governance of domestic listed companies. Neither internal control mechanism nor external control mechanism can settle the agency-principal problem of domestic listed companies.With the development of stock market, a lot of control rights...