Independent Industrial And Mining Areas Of Corporate Governance Behavior Analysis

The Enterprise of Independent Industrial and mining District (EIIMD for short) has taken great function in the economic development and industrialization of our country. They have become the important part of our national industry after 1980s; the reform to open produced the profound influence of EIIMD. Along with the decreasing of the national investment and the quick variety of the economic system, the original developing mode suffered the violent impact while many contradictions and problem growing obvious .The consistence of development face the serious threat .Our party and government paid attention to a series of realistic problem of EIIMD on their development process. It also made the problems concerning the EIIMD become the foals of academic researchThe operation status of a enterprise mostly lies on the efficiency of the corporate governance structure. And the efficiency of the corporate governance straightly depends on the rationality of allotment in property rights. The distortion of EIIMD's behavior and the inefficiency in administration is largely because that EIIMD's interior arrangement of property rights cannot meet the demand of market economy. It especially appears to be incomplete property rights causing by the separation of rights and obligations on national property. The paper points out that incomplete property is the main cause of EIIMD's distorted behavior, and profoundly analyses how the combination leads to the incomplete property rights. Therefore, to solve the problem that inconsequence of the EIIMD's behavior completely, government and enterprises must be separated; enterprises' own rights must be admitted and respected; from the view of property right, EIIMD must be made to own complete residual rightBut even the government and enterprises have been separated, the distribution of residual rights is restricted ultimately by the market On the condition that all kinds of markets are not perfect at all, it will lead to "Insiders Control" if we give the operator too much residual rights. From the view of corporate governance's developing, the paper analyzes the cause the essential of "Insider control" and points out that the matter of it is that some side of property rights' main part infracts the others' rights taking advantage of the information, and it is also the result of incomplete property rights and distortion of corporate governance. From the view of interior corporate governance the paper explainsthe things concerning the reconstruction of directorate and the introduction of independent director, it also discuss the accomplishment evaluation and the incentive manager. Then starting with die relationship between property rights and market, the paper analyzes the market of managers, stocks and products market, in addition to the outer corporate governance to EIIMD. it also discuss how to optimal corporate governance with stake holder. In the end, the paper elucidate the choice of the EIIMD's outer corporate governance...