Analysis Of The Heterogeneity Of Individual Preferences And Public Goods Private Supply

In this paper, we will depart from the individual strategy of utility maximum, and analyze the private provision level of public goods in the repeated game through modeling. In the first place, this paper introduces the threshold provision level of public goods. This paper suggests that without the consideration of individual heterogeneity factor, a shot game individual's non-cooperation is irrelative to individuals' heterogeneity in the condition of the threshold provision level when the available nature resources are not exhausted. If the aggregate individual input level for the public goods provision meets the threshold provision level, the individual who acts according to utility Maximization may not cooperate. However, this decision is relative to the individual's preferences respectively. In the next pace, this paper employs discount parameter to characterize the individual's preference for the public goods. The model in this paper uses two utility functions, quasi-linear function and Cobb-Douglas function to discuss the between the group or collectivity scale and the cooperation action of public goods provision. There are admissible values of the discount parameter such that the optimal level of cooperation may be maintained within an infinitely large group. This optimal level of provision is itself increasing in the size of the group.