Governance Structure Of State-owned Listed Companies Based On The Performance Of Absolute / Relative Holding A Comparative Study

In the process of the integration of global economy and finance, the feature of corporate governance is becoming assimilated: evolving to the style of relative control—the compromise of control and decentralized control—which is increasingly becoming the prevailing style of control internationally.The reformation and open policy of China is to establish market economy system in macro-economy, and to establish modern corporate institution in micro-economy. The structure of corporate governance is the core of modern corporate institution.The governance style of a corporation influences the strategic development and management performance of the organization; whereas the governance style of a nationinfluences the economic development and growth potential of the country. The integration of global economy forces the corporations in China to meet the international requirementin corporate governance. Based on such a background, Chapter 1 of the thesis putsforward the necessity of comparative research on the corporate governance structureand management performance between the absolutely-controlled and relatively-controlled listed state-owned enterprises of China.Based on literature review and theory analysis, combined with research achievements on corporate governance of domestic and foreign scholars, and the relative information of the listed corporations, Chapter 2 points out that the emergence and development of the corporation governance structure of listed state-owned enterprises of China have different original states and restricting conditions with those in developed nations. It is a process of institution innovation and mutation greatly influenced by human design and intervention, and it is not a spontaneously changing process emerged with the development of modern corporations. There are inevitably some wounds of planned economy in many aspects of corporate governance such as entrustment agency, management motivation and restriction.Combined with data from current securities market in China, Chapter 3 utilizes statistic and multi-analysis, comparatively researches the differences of the corporate governance structure and management performance between the absolute-controlled and relatively-controlled listed state-owned enterprises, comparatively analyses the structure and the operating quality of Board of Directors between the absolutely-controlled and relatively-controlled listed state-owned enterprises, gives imperical research on the influence of shareholding alteration upon management performance of the corporations. Conclusions include that the management performance, the structure and the operating...