Corporate Governance Effect Of MBO

Because of the global financial crisis, the reform of the state-owned enterprises caused a lot of attention again. After the economic crisis, the development of private enterprises face a lot of problem due to their limitations, which causes reminiscent of the 90's privatization wave. As privatization of the state-owned enterprises was an important way to solve inefficient of state-owned enterprises.As an important means of privatization of state-owned enterprises, MBO (Management Buyout) was introduced into China in early 90's.Because it can make property rights clear, and generate incentive effect, privatization wave cause lots of concern in the 21st Century, even more people called the year "2003" as "MBO Years." But after the recent crisis, the development of private enterprises faces various problems. So we can't help question the state-owned enterprises reform:after the privatization completed, managers instead of countries obtain the control right, is the company management level really improved, and which effect help to explain the improvement of corporate performance? From the perspective of corporate governance, we study the way to effect the management buyouts of listed companies in China. According to agency theory, management buyouts can increase corporate efficiency by reducing agency costs between companies and managers. But according to the "internal control", after MBO, Managers obtain the control rights,and they have motivation to occupy the interests of other shareholders. According to management incentive and entrepreneurship theory, after the acquisition managers can stimulate entrepreneurship to improve corporate efficiency.Different corporate governance mechanisms cause different results, then which mechanism play a role in management buyout? In this paper, theoretical analysis and empirical research methods combined, we test the corporate governance mechanisms of MBO using listed companies sample.This article is divided into seven chapter:The first chapter is an introduction, including the background and significance, ideas and frameworks. ChapterⅡis a review of management buyouts. The development of MBO in Foreign and China; summarizes and comments the literature of management buyouts.ChapterⅢis theory study on corporate governance mechanism of MBO. According to the corporate governance theory, we analysis three corporate governance mechanisms of MBO, and bring about three proposed hypotheses of this paper.ChapterⅣis research design and statistical analysis. This chapter describes data sources, and statistical characteristics of main variables.ChapterⅤis empirical analysis.Based on panel data, we test the performance of management buyouts, and the role of the three corporate governance mechanisms.ChapterⅥis case analysis. Because of restrictions of years, empirical analysis can not fully verify the foregoing theoretical analysis. this part we can using case study to provide evidence on corporate governanceand mechanism of MBO for a longer yearChapterⅦ, conclusions and recommendations. According to foregoing analysis, we obtain the corporate governance mechanisms which have an effect,.And future research recommendations are given on the study of the reform of state enterprises.