An Empirical Study Of The Relationship Between Governance Structure And Agency Cost In Our Country PLC

In the background of china characteristics socialism system, the development of capital market but thirty years, and compared the capital market in western countries, it appear more "childish", can says as the capital market with Chinese characteristics. In a word, China's capital market can be summarized as two features, the biggest characteristic is a high concentration of ownership; the second largest feature is exterior governance environment of extremely imperfect. Based on this, studies how to improve the listed company stock ownership structure and how to improve the system environment is everlasting topic of scholars from the company governance. In this research, this dissertation attempts to verify the listed company governance structure and agency costs produced in each stakeholder by means of theoretical analysis and empirical study, the purpose is to realize fair, fair and objective capital markets under our due contribution.In the choice of substitution variable about corporate governance, we mostly focused on two research dimensions, the first study dimension is the company's equity structure, measuring the ownership structure variables are used for this equity concentration and equity balance degree; The second study dimension is the company's debt structure, measuring the debt financing structure variables this dissertation adopts the asset-liability ratio and liquidity ratio. So, combined with the uniqueness of China's capital market, we study the agency costs produced in each stakeholder, and we mainly focused on two cases agency costs, the first scenario produced in shareholders and company management, because they have inconstant profit so that arising from the agency conflicts; The second scenario produced in the controlling shareholder and small and medium shareholders, because agency costs produced in whether it has the information superiority.This dissertation attempts to take up in 2006 the share-trading reform of listed companies as the base, empirical research before and after the reform of non-tradable shares listed company governance structure and each stakeholder relations between agency costs, to test reform of non-tradable shares of listed company governance structure and stakeholders, agency cost in order to the influence of corporate governance structure optimization and stakeholder agency cost minimization with pertinence and put forward Suggestions and measures.