Research On The Principal-agent Risk In The Social Security Funds Investment

The social security fund is the national implementation of social security system. Social security fund management agencies must make to the value of pension funds as a primary goal of investment operations,for the foundation of safety and mobility of strict. Social security fund faced great pressure with the acceleration of the aging population. Therefore the value investment management institution needs to rely on the professional advantages to that part of the fund investment operations. Participating in the social security fund entrust investment operation is different each subject with the interests of the economic subject, If principal-agent mechanism design undeserved can harm the interests of the principal because of pursuing trigger agents own benefits.Therefore, social security fund investment operation process faces a severe principal-agent risk. In recent years, the case of social security funds is frequently staged. And,Under the impact of the financial crisis, the national social security fund entrusted stock investment appeared for the first time in 2008. Under the enormous pressure of social security fund and the risks of investment operations, scientific choice and properly handle the principal-agent relationship has become an urgent problem to be solved.lt aims at effectively preventing risks prouced by regular principal-agent. Based on the related the national social security fund, the interim measures for the administration of social insurance law and social security funds entrusted investment situation, this thesis introduces each subject and main responsibilities in the social security fund investment operation using the principal-agent theory.This paper analyzes the multilevel operation of social security fund investment; indicated that because of the principal-agent relationship of social security fund principal-agent relationship existing institutional, the adverse selection and moral hazards; analyses the reasons caused by social security fund principal-agent risks. Finally, this thesis puts forward the corresponding control strategies according to the principal-agent related incentive and restrictive theory. These strategies are also based on the principal-agent present situations of China's social security fund investment operation, the manegement of normative social security fund, perfection of incentive mechanism, establishment of the risk compensation mechanism.