Research On Optimal Allocation Of Ownership Right In High-Tech Enterprise R&D Joint Venture

Knowledge has become the most important resource except for capital, labor and land in the 21st century. Obtaining and using knowledge are one of means to make and maintain competitive advantage, especially for high-tech enterprises. The arrival of the knowledge economy era prompts managers and various scholars to continuously raise concerns about the knowledge management; especially the increase of the amount of enterprises' knowledge has become the focus problem which is concerned by enterprises and scholars at present. The high-tech enterprises quickly and effectively increase the enterprises' knowledge holdings the enterprise knowledge through sharing knowledge in knowledge alliance, at the same time, as a way of effectively avoiding innovation risks, which has been paid more and more attention in enterprise and academic circles at home and abroad. From improving the independent innovation capability of the high-tech enterprises' knowledge alliance, this article is to study ownership allocation of R&D joint venture based on dynamic game.Knowledge alliance has been paid more and more attention in high-tech industry. The most of previous researches on knowledge alliance were around how to choose the alliance parterners and how to implement knowledge management in the alliance, but they were not around the way of defining proportions of the sharing knowledge input to realize the best profit in knowledge alliance. Generally spearking, the alliances have two or more participants, and they will be cooperat in a long time, so it has practical significance for reaserch on optimal allocation of ownership in a long time.It unifies the dynamic game model correlation theories to construct dynamic game models which optimal allocation of ownership right of two main body cooperation R&D joint venture, and judge their know-how disclosure strategy and knowledge innovation investment, and the empirical results show that: obtaining the ownership of core assets in R&D joint ventures is necessary conditions for disclosure their technical know-how, horizontal or vertical ownership structure arrangement could be the most superior property rights structure arrangement in two main body two stages of cooperative innovation joint ventures optimal ownership allocation.It unifies the dynamic game model correlation theories to construct dynamic game models which optimal allocation of ownership right of three main body cooperation R&D joint venture base on two body cooperation, and judge their know-how disclosure strategy and knowledge innovation investment, and the empirical results show that: the common owenership of core assets is the most superior property rights structure arrangement in R&D joint ventures, and it can lead to maximizing of investment in technical know-how disclosure and efforts.