The Research On Explicit Incentive Mechanism In Chinese Fund Manager

After more than130years development, securities investment fund has shown an incompatible growth, which has been more than one hundred times than ever before in the recent years. Securities investment fund is a collective investment to carry out portfolio investment, professional management and benefit and risk sharing. Because investment fund entrusted others to invest and manage for investors, so, it needs to pay some fees from set up to termination. In various cost of fund, the most important one is the compensation of fund managers, fund management fees. It also has great influence on funds net income as it is the main expense in funds'operation. On the issue of fund management fee, because it need to be afford by fund investors, so they hope to minimum the management fee; but as the income party, fund manager rely on the extraction of fund management fee to sustain operation and development, and inevitably to maximum the management fee. Therefore, the interest conflict between fund managers and investors emerged, so this paper established an effective incentive mechanism to protect fund investors'benefits and in the meanwhile to give fund managers a more reasonable reward and to stimulate fund managers provide investors with better investment service. Besides, this paper used Blake-Scholes option pricing model to design fund management fee rate, in this way can achieve the double effect that not only to spur fund managers and also protect the investors, so the fund managers'explicit incentive mechanism received further improvement and perfection.This article specifically content as follows:Part1is the introduction, which is specifically presented the research background, research significance, main research contents and research method, the dynamic research at home and abroad, important and difficult point and innovations.Part2is the theoretical bases and literature review of this study.Part3explained the necessity of our country's fund manager's explicit incentive mechanism and introduced the present status and problems of existing explicit incentive mechanism.Part4particularly analysed the foreign fund managers'explicit incentive mechanism after fully understood domestic fund development. Then make a comparison to learn lessons and provide guidance for government to policy making about fund manager's incentive and companies to make the incentive mechanism. Part5is empirical research and design of our country's fund management fee when combined the Blake-Scholes option pricing model.Part6is to present a series of countermeasures which aims to solve the existing problems of our country's fund managers'explicit incentive mechanism upon the analysis of mentioned above.Part7is the conclusion.