A Mechanism Design Of Reducing Corporate Environmental Pollution Under Uncertain Environments

Since the industrial revolution, there has been a great progress in every coun-try’s economic strength. During the sharp increase, the excessive consumption ofnatural resources and environmental emissions done by the company led to theacute ecological environment problems. If laissez-faire these problems to spreadrather than to control and cure, it will inevitably lead to regional ecological crisis,which ?nally a?ects the survival and development of human society. Thus, it isof great practical signi?cance to study how to design a mechanism to reducingthe corporate’s consumption on the environment.In this thesis, the principal-agent theory is applied to study this issue. Inthis mechanism design, the relationship between government and corporate isregarded as principal-agent, where the government is the principal while thecorporate is the agent. The government aims to design a mechanism which revealsthe corporate’s consumption on the environment. By this, the government couldlimit the excessive emissions, which e?ectively protect the environment.First, it explores a mechanism design under random environment. Modelwhich responses to the relationship between government and corporate is estab-lished. Through the model analysis and solution, the optimal solution undercomplete information and the second-best solution under asymmetric informa-tion are obtained respectively. By comparing them, the results show that thismechanism can e?ectively limit the corporate’s pollution on the environment.Besides, it explores a mechanism design under fuzzy environment. Modelwhich responses to the relationship between government and corporate is estab-lished. Then the model is converted into a boundary constraint optimal controlproblem through series of transformations. In the end, a numerical example isgiven to show the e?ectiveness of the mechanism.