Theoretical Review And Institutional Reconstruction Of China's Vertical Management Reform Of Environmental Protection From The Perspective Of Principal-agent Theory

Since the 21 st century,the number of mass incidents caused by ecological environment pollution has shown a straight upward trend,and the protection of ecological environment is becoming more and more important.How to ensure economic development while taking into account environmental benefits is an urgent problem to be solved.Therefore,in today's political discourse,environmental protection has become more and more important.Secretary Xi Jinping has also put forward the slogan "lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets".In order to further standardize environmental governance,China has taken many measures in terms of system,of which the vertical management reform of environmental protection agencies is a very important part of the policy measures.China's current vertical management system of environmental protection agencies refers to the personnel and funds under the direct leadership of the provincial environmental protection department and responsible for the environmental monitoring and supervision agencies at the city(prefecture)and county levels,with the municipal(prefecture)environmental protection bureau sending the county-level environmental protection bureau and the municipal(prefecture)environmental protection bureau directly leading it,thus making the county-level environmental protection bureau no longer a functional department of the county-level government.The main purpose of implementing the vertical management system of environmental protection agencies is to strengthen the state's macro-control over environmental protection and effectively crack down on environmental pollution,thus achieving the goal of "returning green water and green mountains to me".By separating environmental protection agencies from local governments,the independence of environmental protection agencies is strengthened,local protectionism is weakened,and the phenomenon of local governments interfering in the implementation of environmental policies to achieve economic benefits is curbed,which is conducive to the implementation of environmental protection measures.Environmental protection policies have had little effect for a long time,mainly due to the following two reasons.On the one hand,local governments excessively pursue economic development while ignoring environmental quality,and do not hesitate to sacrifice environmental quality to achieve the established economic goals,which also causes the imbalance between economic development and environmentalprotection.On the other hand,the territorial-based environmental protection management system has also made it difficult to unify the environmental protection law enforcement among regions and to communicate less among regions,thus making it difficult to solve the problem of cross-basin and cross-regional environmental pollution.In order to solve these problems,the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18 th Central Committee put forward the reform path of vertical management of local environmental protection agencies.The central government carries out vertical management in the environmental protection system,adjusts the organizational relationships and functional settings of environmental protection agencies below the provincial level,and adjusts the power of local governments in the field of environmental protection through restructuring environmental protection businesses,thus ensuring the smooth implementation of the environmental policies formulated by the central government.Although some provincial environmental protection agencies have made outstanding achievements in vertical management reform in environmental management,there are still many problems and difficulties in practical operation.Based on the principal-agent theory,literature research and comparative research,this paper takes the manubrium system of environmental protection agencies in the United States and Germany as examples,and points out that the current vertical management system of environmental protection agencies in China still has the following problems:First,many clients lead to unclear powers and responsibilities,sharp contradictions between the direct management department and the local government,undermining the integrity of the functions of the local government,resulting in the absence of the local government to fulfill its responsibilities,and some central environmental protection policies and provincial environmental protection policies are difficult to effectively implement.Second,the chain of entrustment is too long,the efficiency is low,and the supervision system is unclear.Third,the entrustment order is not clear and cannot be uploaded and issued.The order is forbidden.Fourth,there is a lack of initial clients and grass-roots supervision over the environmental enforcement actions of environmental protection agencies.On this basis,this paper is divided into five parts.The first part states the formation logic of China's environmental protection manubrium reform from two aspects: the necessity of China's environmental protection manubrium reform and theproblems to be solved.The second part introduces the measures taken by China's environmental protection manubrium reform and their effects.The third part reviews the reform of China's environmental protection manubrium theoretically by introducing the basic connotation of the principal-agent theory,the necessary requirements of the principal-agent theory for the reform of China's environmental protection manubrium and the existing deficiencies.The fourth part takes the vertical management system of environmental protection in the United States and Germany as an example to introduce the overseas experience of environmental protection in manubrium.The fifth part aims at the deficiency of the third part and puts forward corresponding system suggestions.