Self-Representationalism Of Consciousness

Consciousness is one of the most important areas of philosophy, especially in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. We are conscious; however, the noun "consciousness" is not easily defined."Being conscious or not" is not an easy question, since there may always be a gap between conscious and unconscious. This thesis focuses on the question of consciousness:What makes a mental state a conscious mental state? Phenomenal consciousness is the property mental states have when, and only when, there is something it is like for their subject to undergo them, or be in them. What it is like to have a conscious experience is customarily referred to as the experience’s phenomenal character. So we can answer that question by explain a state’s phenomenal character in terms of its representation. Probably the two most cited representationalism of consciousness are First-Order Representationalism (FOR) and Higher-Order Representationalism (HOR). FOR is the theory that attempts to account for a conscious state’s phenomenal character in terms of its representational content. According to HOR, mental states are not conscious in virtue of representing, but in virtue of being represented. In other words, they are conscious because they are themselves the representational contents of higher-order representations. HO theorists are united in the belief that their approach can better explain consciousness than any purely First-Order theory, which has significant difficulty in explaining the difference between unconscious and conscious mental states. As with First-Order Representationalism, numerous arguments such as argument from targetless higher-order representations have been offered against HOR.Another related and increasingly popular version of representational theory-Self-Representationalism(SR)—has been offered by Uriah Kriegel. Self-Representationalism is the main field of this thesis. According to SR, whatever else a conscious experience represents, it always also represents itself; and it is in virtue of thus representing itself that it is conscious. Moreover, there is a serious advantage for SR over its competition.This thesis is organized as follows:In Introduction, I raise a question and offer an introduction of theories of consciousness, especially as found in contemporary research of representationalism. In Chapter1, I offer a very summary survey of the merits and demerits of First-Order Representationalism. The main argument for First-Order Representationalism is the argument from transparency. When you examine your experience of the world, you cannot but see the world right through it-as though the experience was in itself transparent. Here I offer Tye’s "PANIC theory". However, there are numerous arguments by counter-example have been offered against FOR, especially against transparency. In Chapter2, I offer a very summary survey of the merits and demerits of Higher-Order Representationalism. The main argument for HOR starts from the observation that conscious states are states we are aware of having. Now, being aware of something is a matter of having a representation of it. It follows that what makes a mental state conscious is the subject’s having a higher-order representation of it. Here I offer a theory of Rosenthal. A common initial objection to HOR theories is that they lead to an infinite regress and draws on the possibility of targetlesss higher-order representations. Here I offer four problems for Higher-Order Representationalism. In Chapter3, I offer a very detailed survey of the argument of Self-Representationalism. According to Kriegel, a conscious experience can be divided into two components:"subjective character" and "qualitative character". Subjective character is the central explanandum of the theory of consciousness. The fundamental argument for Self-Representationalism about subjective character can be set out in three stages:(1) from subjective character to inner awareness;(2)from inner awareness to representation;(3)from representation to self-representation. Here Kriegel offers three arguments:"argument from awareness-making","argument from familiarity","epistemic argument". In Chapter4, I offer a very detailed survey of four advantages of Self-Representationalism. The possibility of targetless higher-order representations, the prospects of epiphenomenal and non-mental conscious states, and the difficulties accounting for intimacy bedevil the HOR but not SR. so it is formed four advantages of Self-Representationalism. Finally, in Conclusion, I offer a conclusion and answer the question above.