On Cold War Ideology

There is an almost undisputed consensus in the present era that the decision ofPresident Lyndon Johnson to commit hundreds of thousands of American combattroops to fight in South Vietnam was a mistake of gigantic proportions. The UnitedStates became involved in the war for a number of reasons, and these evolved and shifted overtime. Many scholars both at home and abroad have done many researches on theLyndon Johnson’s escalation of the Vietnam War from different perspectives. Insearch of how such a misguided venture as the American participation in the VietnamWar could have happened, historians and scholars have written much about thepersonality of Johnson and the false advisory process surrounding the President.In this thesis, by focusing on the critical months from November1964to July1965, during which Johnson launched the bombing of North Vietnam and dispatchedmajor U.S ground combat forces to South Vietnam, the author wants to prove that thecold war time cold war ideology contributed greatly to President Lyndon Johnson’scritical decisions to escalate the Vietnam War during the brief period from November1964to July1965. Cold war ideology, with its emphasis on global containment andanti-communism, served as a powerful internal force, unconsciously driving Johnsonto broaden Vietnam War; whereas the Cold war ideology of both President LyndonJohnson and his influential top advisors acted as a catalyst for Johnson and hisadvisors to sink into the quagmire of Vietnam War with the aim to preserve anindependent and non-communist South Vietnam.