The U.S. Cognition And Policy Toward Vietnam Nationalism In Early Cold War Era(1945-1960)

In World War ?, American and the Soviet Union developed a cooperative relationship. American and the Soviet Union started against each other after the World War ?. And they added their influence in the third world, which had a great impact on the relationship between American and the Soviet Union and development process of the third world countries. In the early years of Cold War, American cognition towards Vietnam nationalism, based on communism or not, pro-western or not, was incorrect. The U.S. had taken measures to contain communists and support the pro-westerns:in Philippines, the U.S. had cracked down Hooker movement; in Indonesia, the U.S. had offered its support after Sukarno took action to put down the communists. Vietnam provides us the best example to explain how the Cold War mentality works. The U.S. had taken totally different policies towards North Vietnam (Viet Minh before August Revolution) and South Vietnam. And this put the U.S. into a difficult position.The paper consists of four parts, including the preface, the text body, the epilogue and the bibliography. The preface includes the reasons for choosing title, the purport, the current state, the basis, the basic thoughts, some new ideas and shortcoming of the research.And the text body has six chapters as following:The first chapter of the text body describes how Vietnam nationalism form, it dated back to modern times when French began their colonial rules in Indochina, and what are Vietnam Nationalist appeals all about.The second and the third chapter of the text body analyses how Truman administration recognized the Vietnam nationalism and what policy Truman administration had been made. The second chapter states Truman administration cognition towards the Vietnam nationalism varied from vague to clear. From vary beginning, there were different voices in American government. The Far Eastern Affairs doubted that French state Viet Minh was communism. But the main stream believed that Ho Chi Minh and Viet Minh did communism and they claimed themselves all were nationalists to get public sympathy. During these years, Truman administration hold the view that Bao Dai regime was a puppet, but it represented the real Vietnam nationalists and hoped that Bao Dai regime would attract more nationalists. The third chapter describes how the second terms of Truman administration cognition and policy towards Vietnam go further. At this stage, the international surroundings had changed. The founding of new China and the Sino-Soviet alliance enlarged the communism block. The new China had send "volunteers" to Korean battle. All this made American administration believed the communism was expanding. During this time, the Truman administration firmly insisted that North Vietnam represented communism, which covered by nationalism. The American administration was not satisfied with Bao Dai in attracting Vietnam nationalists, it also forced French to grant more powers to Bao Dai. The second terms of Truman administration provided more aids to French and Bao Dai to deal with communist expanding, and got involved in the First Indochina War.The forth and the fifth chapter of the text body analyses how Eisenhower administration recognized the Vietnam nationalism and what policy had been made. And those two chapters are both focus of the paper. In the Forth chapter, Eisenhower administration inherited the Truman administration cognition and policy. Eisenhower administration has increased the aid, but French performed not well in the war and was bound to fail. During this time, Eisenhower administration emphasized that North Vietnam represented the communism and ignored their nationalism appeals. On the contrary, America increased the aid to Bao Dai, and push French to grant more power to Bao Dai. At the same time, Eisenhower administration was afraid of French's withdraw. America played the mediator role between French and Bao Dai. As things going down, Geneva Conference had convened. Eisenhower administration believed this was a sign of communism victory. The fifth chapter analyzes the changes in the U.S. cognition and policy toward Vietnam after Geneva Conference. America felt disappointment about the situation and Geneva Conference began a new era in U.S. Policy towards Vietnam. Eisenhower administration believed communists had obtained a base for expanding and growing strength in North Vietnam threated South Vietnam. Eisenhower administration, however, considered North Vietnam would not start a war, the communists would subvert South Vietnam through non-military instead. In South Vietnam, Eisenhower administration fostered Ngo Dinh Diem regime and believed there was essential difference between Bao Dai and Ngo Dinh Diem. Bao Dai regime represented nationalist, more in important it was a Puppet. Ngo Dinh Diem regime represented nationalists and Eisenhower administration would support Ngo Dinh Diem and built South Vietnam to be a free legal constitutional government.The last chapter of the text body is about cognition and policy of the U.S. toward Vietnam in early cold war era and a summary to the U.S. cognition toward Vietnam nationalism from Truman to Eisenhower administration. It has experienced vague to clear and deepen through the whole Truman administration. The Eisenhower administration inherited the Truman's cognition before Geneva Conference and Eisenhower administration deepen and solid the cognition toward Vietnam nationalism and there were changes after Geneva Conference. The U.S. cognition toward Vietnam nationalism in early cold war era were not accurate, the policy inevitably beard the hallmarks of the era.At the end of this paper, the author refines the idea of the paper.