National Interest Game Based On The Idea Of Carbon Tariffs

Carbon tariffs for a country to protect the environment in dealing with the crisisof global warming on the grounds, a special additional levy on the basis of the generaltariff on exports of high energy consumption of the country with no greenhouse gasemission and limits of environmental taxes reduction This hinders his country’sproducts entering the domestic market, so as to achieve the purpose to protect thedomestic market. It was first proposed by former French President Jacques Chirac, theintention was to hope that EU nations should be levied for failure to comply with theKyoto Protocol,"the State of imports of goods, tax, and its essence is a green tariff, isa broad technical trade barriers."Carbon tariff" is deeply rooted in the EuropeanUnion and the United States was once extremely popular "carbon politics" conceptand "low-carbon and political" ideology itself is in fact in the context of theinternational climate change, a carbon emissions the political and economic gamemeans, especially in the trend of the global economic downturn of the post-financialcrisis era and the era of European debt crisis has been widely applied to the respectivenational development strategies and national interests. In essence, carbon tariffs is aninternational political and economic problem, which is hidden behind the complexityof the strategic interests of the game.This paper first analyzes the social basis of the formation of carbon tariffs as wellas the political foundation as well as the economic and technological basis, and thenput forward the relevant legal basis,"carbon tariff" and "low-carbon economy" as thestarting point from the game between the developed countries, developingcooperation between the countries with interest demands, as well as between China,U.S., EU and other countries at all levels of intense game and competition in theanalysis. It mainly based on the theory of public choice theory in internationalrelations theory and international mechanisms as the theoretical basis, the use of gametheory, in-depth analysis of the different positions of the above game dominated bythe parties in the different carbon political philosophy for a "carbon tariff" and"low-carbon economy" profoundly reveals the game parties in a "carbon tariff" behindthe evolution of complex national interests. Finally, of the end-result will be back to the collection of "carbon tariffs" maybring to China’s impacts, and proposed response strategies. The purpose is to expectto solve the global warming caused by a series of international interests of the gamean effective way, and ultimately find out a new pathway for China’s own low-carboneconomic development, in the increasingly fierce international "carbon tariff" game,to the greatest degree of safeguarding national interests.