Multi-view Collaborative Modeling Of Incentive Policies Under Main Manufacturer-suppliers Mode

The "main manufacturer-suppliers" mode is universal applied in production of complex productscurrently. Conflict between the main manufacturer and suppliers will threaten the long-term stabilityoperation of complex products supply chain. How to establish effective incentive mechanism betweenthe main manufacturer and suppliers, to improve suppliers involved in cooperation, to promote theinterests of the whole supply chain at the same time not damage the interests of the suppliers is themain problems faced by the main manufacturers. Establishing suitable incentive mechanism for "themain manufacturer-suppliers" model, incenting suppliers from different perspectives, is acomprehensive project but meaningful effort.This paper research the incentives coordination of main manufacturer and suppliers indevelopment of complex products. This paper analyzes the formation of the "mainmanufacturers-suppliers" mode firstly, as to the characteristic of price and volume are relatively stablein transaction, the efforts of the main manufacturer and suppliers largely determine the level of thecomplex product, so this paper was established by the effort under the three different perspectives ofinterests sharing, benefits inducing and cost sharing to incentive. From the perspective of interestssharing, through the advantage and dominant position of the main manufacturers, with Shapley valueallocation of the supply chain benefits assigned to coordinate and improve the supplier’s effort as wellas to improve the supply chain as a whole. From the perspective of interests inducting,it firstlyestablishes conflict economics model for n-suppliers, in the model get the strategy for suppliers in theconflict. Secondly, it establishes Stackelberg model with the main manufacturer providing fixedincentives and the supplier compete it, the suppliers make up the loss by competing the interest withinthe fixed incentives. From the perspective of cost-sharing, it establishes three different models undercertain conditions to encourage suppliers to improve the level of effort--Nash model, Stackelbergmodel and the cooperative model. The results show that equilibrium will turn from Nash equilibriumto Stackelberg equilibrium, and under certain conditions, turn to the cooperative equilibrium—thePareto optimal state. The three different forms of incentive ways all enable suppliers to improve effortand the interests of the whole supply chain as well as the main manufacturer, without compromisingthe suppliers.From the above studies, it is hoping to enrich and stimulate the development of supply chaincoordination model in theoretical, to provide a complete incentive coordination framework for themain manufacturers, to promote relations between the main manufacturer and supplier and advancethe "main manufacturer-supplier "mode.