Research On Decision-making And Coordination Of Competitive Supply Chain Dominated By Manufacturers

With the aggravation of competition among supply chains, the range of the competitionis enlarging gradually, including market competition and competition between retail channelsand raw materials. Due to the difference of substitutability of products, the intensity of thecompetition is also different. How to establish whole competitive strategy of supply chainsand improve core competitiveness of the supply chains has become especially important.On the basis of relative literature research, quantity demand both influenced by productprice and effort level of the products is considered, and optimal decision making andcoordination problems of the supply chain composed of two manufactures and one retailer onthe condition that the manufacture dominates are researched in this paper. Relative benefitsserve as objective function, mathematical models under modes of decentralized decision,partial alliance decision, alliance decision and direct selling channels are establishedrespectively, goal programming, bi-level programming and relative mathematic optimizationmethods are utilized to obtain the optimal market retail price and effort level of the productsunder different modes and design numerical examples respectively for auxiliary analysis. Bymeans of comparison of the optimal strategies under different modes, decision makingmechanism and coordination problems of competitive supply chains on the condition that themanufactures take income maximization or preemption of retail channels as targets accordingto difference of competition strategies of the manufactures are researched respectively.Finally get the following conclusions:(1) The optimal market retail price and effort level of the products are both influencedby the market retail price and effort level of substitute goods. The higher the substituted levelis, the larger the influence is. With other conditions unchanged, profit margin of products soldby retailers is also the key factor to influence the optimal market retail price and effort level.The higher the profit margin is, the higher effort level is.(2) Under the decentralized decision mode, a single coordination mechanism that themanufacture bears part retail effort cost can not coordinate the supply chains to achieve anintegrated state completely, but combination of wholesale price and effort cost compensatingmechanism can coordinate the supply chains to achieve the coordination state.(3) The root cause that influence the optimal market retail price and effort level of theproducts is wholesale price of the product and the wholesale price of the substitute goods.However, under the whole alliance decision mode, the optimal decision of product 1 does notinfluenced by the wholesale price of the substitute goods, once the wholesale price of thesubstitute goods is decided, the optimal strategy of the product 1 is decided correspondingly, and the competition games between the manufactures have the characteristics of theadvantage of backwardness.(4) Under the whole alliance decision mode, the coordination between the competitivesupply chains depends on characteristic parameters of mutual substitute goods. Whenaffection degree of the substitute good 2 to the product 1 equals to the affection degree of theeffort level of the product 2 to the product 1, the optimal decision coordination under thepartial alliance mode achieves the direct selling channel mode.(5) By the numerical samples, when the manufactures take maximization of gross returnof the products as the object function, the whole alliance decision is the optimal decision.When the manufactures take preemption of the retail channel and the market as the goal, thepartial alliance decision is the optimal decision, the market retail price of the product 1 andthe effort level of the substitute good reach the lowest, and the self effect level reaches thehighest.