Research On Perishable Product Supply Chain Coordination Under Loss-averse

With the deepening of economic globalization, and the development of informationtechnology, the enterprise can get more opportunities to develop the business. But at the sametime, the enterprise also faces more intense market competition, the enterprise will face of theexternal environment of the complexity and uncertainty even more significant. Differentmarket competition transferred from the different enterprises into the different supply chains.How to achieve supply chain coordination, improve the overall efficiency of the supply chainand competitive power, and how to meet the needs of the consumers, making the supplychain and the supply chain enterprise in the fierce competition in the market to victory,achieve a "win-win" situation. All of above have become the most academics and businessconcern hot spot.With the progress of science and technology, and the development of the individualneeds of consumers make more and more products have perishable product’s characteristic,how to carry on the perishable product’s supply chain management become the focus of theresearchers. The decision maker’s risk preference for supply chain may have a significantimpact, the traditional risk neutral hypothesis based on the decision makers and enterprisemanagers often have the actual decision produces deviation, so it is very important toconsider the risk of type decision makers in supply chain coordination problem.This paper used prospect theory to depict the decision maker’s risk preferencecharacteristics, under the a leading provider of the two levels of supply chain system, whenretailers face the random demand and its relevant price, in different combinations ofloss-averse in the research of evading the supply chain coordination problem, the mainresearch contents include:First of all, in the wholesale price contract, this paper analyzes the differentcombinations of the loss-averse decision makers to circumvent the characteristics ofdecision-making behavior influence. We found that the retailers can deliver its risk attitude tothe suppliers not only by the order, but also by its sale price to upstream, suppliers can also provide to the contract through its retailers to transmit its risk attitude. Wholesale pricecontract can’t coordinate the supply chain of loss-averse.Next, by considering the price subsidies contract and revenue sharing contract tocoordination the supply chain of loss-averse respectively. In addition, through the numericalexample we found that the different loss aversion of the retailers can affect the choicesupplier contracts.