Study On Equity Structure,senior Management Equity Incentive And Quality Of Accounting Information Disclosure

As the capital market is becoming more and more mature and the arrival of the network information age,China's securities market information disclosure quality also is increasing day by day,however,the current accounting information disclosure of listed companies in our country is still in the bad phenomenon: if some by selective disclosure,the disclosure of information by using the measures of the post processing to cover the authenticity of information and the correlation,some delay disclosure to alleviate the timeliness of the listed company.These bad disclosure behaviors bring very negative impact,seriously hit the confidence of investors,detrimental to the benign operation of our economy.Therefore,the disclosure of accounting information is not only the individual behavior of listed companies,but also the focus of national economic regulation,which is the focus of all kinds of investors.The equity structure of listed companies,to a certain extent,determines the operation and administration of the listed companies,the formation of different attributes and equity of the specific configuration of shareholders directly determines the control and management of resources in the internal distribution of listed companies is different,also can bring top salary incentive mechanism of the differences and play an active role.The establishment of an equity structure suitable for China's current economic environment can make senior executives better exert their initiative,fundamentally ensure the quality of external information disclosure of listed companies,meet the needs of all stakeholders,and thus promote China's economic development.In order to purify the information disclosure environment of listed companies in China and eliminate the untransparent and unreliable cancer of information disclosure from the root,it is not only necessary to improve the relevant systems and laws and regulations of the capital market,but also necessary for listed companies to establish a sound internal governance mechanism.Based on domestic and foreign equity ownership structure and the quality of accounting information disclosure,executive equity incentive and the quality of accounting information disclosure of relevant research literature on the basis of systematic,put forward research hypothesis,selection of main board listed in shenzhen stock exchange from 2014 to 2017 A shares and disclose annual reports of companies as the research object,build the panel regression model of measurement,using STATA software,the sample of the listed company ownership structure,executive equity incentive and the relationship between quality of accounting information disclosure and empirical study,the following conclusions: When the largest shareholder of the listed company has state-owned background,it is beneficial toimprove the quality of accounting information disclosure.When equity balance exists,it is not conducive to improving the quality of accounting information disclosure of listed companies.On the contrary,high concentration of equity is conducive to improving the quality of accounting information disclosure of listed companies,while equity incentive of senior management is not conducive to improving the quality of accounting information disclosure.Based on the above research results,this paper argues that due to the late start of China's capital market,listed companies still rely on the resources support of major shareholders,and the moderate concentration of shares in listed companies is conducive to the benign operation of listed companies and the improvement of the quality of accounting information disclosure.Due to the concentration of equity,the controlling shareholder is more willing to serve as the chairman or general manager.In this case,the controlling shareholder has a higher degree of control over the senior management,and the senior management will consider the will of the controlling shareholder before making various decisions.Equity incentive of senior management plays different roles in different periods.However,according to this study,equity incentive of senior management is not conducive to the improvement of the quality of accounting information disclosure,especially in state-owned holding listed companies.