Study On The Relationship Among Core Stakeholders Of Venture Capital In China

With the rapid development of China’s national economy, the growth of high-tech industries has enhanced the role of the comprehensive national strength. Venture capital, as an incubator of high-tech enterprise development, will directly determine the development of future high-tech industries in China in future. China should seize the opportunity of China’s "12th Five-Year Plan" to develop high-tech and supply better services for high-tech industries. But compared with the United States and other venture capital developed countries, there is a large gap at the macro level or micro level. A sound macro environment for venture capital development hasn’t been formed in our country, and there are many problems to be resolved. This article tries to solve the macro problem countermeasures on the basis of previous research with a brief summary and supplementary. But most of all is to clarify the relationships and conflicts of interest between the various stakeholders of the risk in the investment, based on improving the external investment environment. It is very important to comb through the relationship between the risks of investing in core stakeholders, and find a suitable resolution mechanism to venture capital. And this is also the purpose of this study is located. My company is facing the distorted moral hazard which is due to asymmetric information, principal-agent relationship. So I hope this study can provide more practical help for the future work, and make more indentures to protect the security of the venture capital in institutions and venture capital limited partnership agreement.The paper analyses the problems between the venture capital institutions and venture commissioned in-depth by the knowledge of agency theory and game theory. In order to find out the tripartite interests and demands of the equilibrium point, and to identify the various problems in the venture capital operation, I try to build the tripartite model which is an innovative point in the article. In addition, I also try to build a two-moral game model to explore the impact of the motives of parties’elements of the risk of moral hazard behavior. This is also an innovation of this article which will not enumerate.The full text is divided into five parts.Chapter one is an introduction. This chapter focuses on the papers of the problem and significance. I consider that venture capital limited partnership is better than the corporate system by means of collating and summarizing the literature in the current state of development of China’s, and most of that on the domestic venture capital agency relationships in theory don’t have a certain practical. In this chapter, I introduce stakeholder theory, commissioned by the introduction of agency theory and game theory. Finally, there is also a brief introduction of the research framework and research methods, as well as innovation and shortcomings.Chapter two introduces venture capital classification of China’s venture. Venture capital connotation, the characteristics of venture capital, was introduced primarily. First, it gives the definition of venture capital. Venture Capital is by the manner of equity investment, high-growth enterprises based on innovative technologies to provide financial support, management services, and technical and marketing support business growth with equity value-added investment of excess returns. Then, it classifies the stakeholders in the venture capital by the means of the introduction of power and interests "matrix" in the stakeholder theory, which paves the way to below the risk of investing in core stakeholder relations research.Chapter three discusses the present situation of China’s venture capital, and the problems in coordination of China’s Venture Capital Core Stakeholder Relations. Firstly, it comprehensive introduces China’s risk investment of all aspects through the2010and2011’s latest venture capital data collection. Then, it analyses core stakeholders outside the system and the issues of coordination of venture capital in China’s core interests of stakeholders within the system for analysis.Chapter four is the central part of this article and the greatest innovation. Firstly, it analyses the causes of adverse selection risk investment by game tree. Then, Build a venture capital institution and venture moral Game Model. Finally, build the game model of the tripartite relationship between venture capitalists, venture capital firms and venture, in order to give the analysis in-depth and research on venture capital operation of the tripartite relationship between the core stakeholders.Chapter five is the core part of this article. Targeted measures for macro-level problems of China’s venture capital, venture capital operation system within the principal-agent problem specific practical measures has been proposed in this part through the analysis of Chapter two. three and four. After that, it puts forward the operability of the recommendations of the moral hazard of the risk of investing in core stakeholders, and summarizes the risk investors and venture capital institutions which should pay attention to the terms of the investment in the partnership agreement as well as venture capital firms and venture firms in the investment program.