A Study On The Impact Of Corporate Governance On The Non-normal Turnover Of Senior Executives

As business core person, excecutives are in a pivotal position and play a vital role inan enterprise, their behaviors determine the future trend of enterprise development,butalso ultimately responsible for the corporate business performance. To a certain extent,individual talents,management level and professional degree of executives oftendetermine the future of enterprise prospects, the personal success is a direct impact on thesuccess or failure of the entire enterprise.After the separation of corporate ownership and management rights, executives andshareholders’ interests are not consistent with each other. In order to reduce the cost ofagency,safeguard shareholders’ interests and reduce executives act detrimental to theinterests of shareholders, inside-enterprise will usually establish a series of governancemechanisms to supervise and constraint executives, and by dismissing the incompetentexecutives are the most direct and ultimate way of punishment, this leads to normal andnon-normal turnover of senior executives problem. The purpose of this article is to studyhow governance mechanism of China’s listed companies affect the non-normal turnoverof senior executives,study on how to perfect the corporate governance mechanisms inorder to supervise and constraint the executives’ behaviors of listed companies moreeffectively.To study this problem is because after the rapid development of China’ssecurities market, which has a scale, but executives turnover are also frequently emergedin the development of the security market, executive turnover has usually been seen as aturning point in the enterprise development process, and also is a signal of the futuredevelopment of enterprises, therefore this phenomenon attracts the attention of relevantdepartments and inspires many scholars who are interested in the study of this problem inChina. This article is in the context of this background, based on the sample ofnon-normal turnover executives of listed companies in China from2008to2010as astudy sample,from the perspective of corporate governance,analyzing the impact ofownership structure,characteristics of board of directors, board of supervisors on thenon-normal turnover of senior executives.This article is divided into seven chapters, the first chapter is an introduction,proposed research background and significance of this article, given the definition of theconcept, pointed the research ideas and content structure, list the research methods andinnovations; chapter two summarized on the literature of executive turnover at home andabroad; the third chapter explains the basic theories of executives turnover of listedcompanies, including the theory of principal-agent theory, corporate governance and management incentive theory; the fourth chapter has a descriptive statistics analysis onthe executive turnover status quo of listed companies in China; the fifth chapter discussesthe impact of corporate governance mechanism on the non-normal turnover of seniorexecutives from three aspects, namely, ownership structure, board characteristics,supervisory board and suggests related assumptions;chapter six establishes Logisticregression model between inner corporate governance mechanism variables andnon-normal executives turnover,and taking2008-2010in Shanghai and Shenzhen a-sharelisted companies’s non-normal executives turnover as study samples, companies whichdid not occur executives turnover as reference samples for the positive test. Throughindependent sample t-test, descriptive statistics, correlation and regression analysis, itfinds that the proportion of circulating shares, the proportion of shares held by seniorexecutives, the size of board of directors, and the duality of chairman and generalmanager have significant negative correlation with the turnover of senior executiveswhile ownership concentration, the proportion of independent directors and the size ofboard of supervisors are not necessarily correlated with the turnover of senior executives;chapter seven has come to the conclusion of this study and put forward relevantrecommendations and research prospects for the future.The results of theoretical analysis and empirical test of this article providetheoretical and empirical evidence to the perfection of corporate governance mechanismof chinese enterprises and strengthen supervision and constraint. At the end of paper, thispaper focuses on inadequate corporate governance of listed companies in our country, putforward policy recommendations from deepening the ownership reform,furtherstrengthening the construction and function of board of directors of listed companies tocontinue to strengthen the supervisory function of the board of supervisors of listedcompanies and so on, with a view to accelerate the process of improving our corporategovernance.