Analysis Of Game That The Interest Group Of State-owned Enterprises And Private Enterprises In The Real Estate Industry

In recent years, state-owned enterprises not only vigorously strengthen its monopoly position in the field of iron and steel, petroleum, communications and other traditional monopoly industries, but also enter other competitive industries such as the real estate market, securities and financial markets to become more diversified. We do not discuss whether it is " guo jin min tui"(meaning the state advances and the private retreats), we would like to explore the political reasons behind such behavior-how does state-owned enterprises gain access to the advantages? And what prompted them to do so? In order to macro-control, our country promotes the expansion of the large state-owned enterprises in the national pillar industries or key areas is beyond reproach, but to be alert to the interest groups of the state-owned enterprises mislead policy makers through lobbying and political contributions, resulting in more corruption and more resource loss. Because of institutional defects. Interest groups of the state-owned enterprises have more advantages than other interest groups in government financial subsidies, financing, legislative reform, constructed into restrictions. Together with national unreasonable incentive and restraint mechanisms and performance evaluation mechanism for the management of state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises, especially large state-owned enterprises, have entered the lucrative profits field-private enterprises dominate industry. Diversified business not only is not conducive to the implementation of the social functions of the state-owned enterprises, but also is not conducive to the realization of the state-owned enterprises bigger and stronger long-term goals. From the perspective of the new political economics, this paper analyses how state-owned enterprises through the economic and political advantages to plunder private enterprises. In the long run, in addition to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises, our country should promote the balanced development of the interests groups in China, competing mutual checks and balances between the interest groups, so that the national interest is not damaged due to the impact of a strong interest groups. The article is divided into six parts:the first part briefly introduces ways of participation of interest groups in the new political economics. Legal lobbying and educating voters mainly solves the problem of information asymmetry. Another way is Illegal political contributions. Political contributions are often linked to corruption, because China’s political elections is not public campaigning, but appointments of several leadership. Of course, in the political contributions of the new political economics, the policy-makers take into account their own economic and political interest to choose whether or not to accept political contributions and whose political contributions they should accept. The second part is a brief introduction of the performance of the interest groups (state-owned enterprises and private enterprises)involved in politics. Although private enterprises can take advantage of the National People’s Congress and CPPCC proposals and various associations lobbying and educating voters, but obviously the interest groups of state-owned enterprises have more advantages in lobbying and capturing policy makers. In the third part, we will use the Grossman plundering model to analyses how the state-owned enterprises in a strong position plunder private enterprises in disadvantaged. Great Value (plunder efficiency that an interest group on other interest groups) refers to efficiency that state-owned enterprises plunders private enterprise. Certainly value (refers to resource loss that interest groups plunder other interest groups) is also critical. If private enterprises take advantage of a variety of ways to obstruct the plundering of state-owned enterprises, making them pay high taxes, or more managements plundering the profits of state-owned enterprises. Of course, if private enterprise can safeguard their rights through more political channels, at least in a certain industry they can compete fairly with state-owned enterprises, or the managements of state-owned enterprises under the regulatory system,which can reduce the value. The fourth part takes state-owned enterprises in the real estate industry for an example to the Empirical Analysis. Interest group of state-owned enterprises take advantage of economic and political advantages to enter the real estate industry to plunder private enterprises, while private enterprises also use the NPC proposal and so on to block their way. The fifth section briefly describes hazards that state-owned enterprises plunders private enterprises. The sixth part includes four proposals to promote healthy development of economic and social.