Font Size: a A A

Research On Salary-performance Sensitivity About CEO Of The Listed Firm In The Contract View

Posted on:2014-02-04Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X Z YangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330395482950Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Based on the control of compensation, this paper focuses on the pay contract design of CEO and several other salary management problems in the field. Through the statistical analysis, regression analysis and so on, we obtained the regular result:(1) Executive compensation of listed companies highlights the allocation problem of deep contradictions at present stage in our country.(2) A thorough analysis of ceo compensation management problems need to seek appropriate countermeasures, the need to have a more comprehensive perspective.(3) From annual trend and equity structure view, we can find that there are many flaw for executive compensation management, especially for the state-owned listed companies.(4) In order to build a closer relationship between compensation and performance, macro and micro measures need to be done.
Keywords/Search Tags:Compensation contract, monetary pay, CEO of listed firm, salary-performancesensitivity
PDF Full Text Request
Related items