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Research On Coordination Mechanism Of Supply Chain Contracts Under Disruptions

Posted on:2014-01-12Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:F ZhaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330395483342Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the integration of the global economy, the competition among enterprises is becoming more and more fierce. In order to deal with more complex and changeable market, the enterprises in supply chain system deepen mutual cooperation. The implementation of the supply chain needs some stable external conditions, so the changing external environment seems to be a potential risk. It’s nearly impossible for us to eliminate emergency events fundamentally, so the supply chain system should be more stable to recover. Enhancing the system’s anti-risk, quick-recovery capability to deal with emergencies has very important practical and guiding significance.This paper studies on the coordination mechanism of a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer under disruptions. A mathematical modeling is established for the decision-maker to analyze how to adjust the production plan and the pricing strategy to maximize the profit of supply chain when market scale, price sensitivity coefficient and production cost are disrupted simultaneously. In this paper, the supplier and retailer agree to adopt either revenue-sharing contract or quantity-discount contract to coordinate the supply chain. In the process of the contract, the system comes across some emergency event which leads to disruption. When disruption happens, the decision-maker should first estimate the influence caused by emergency events. If the influence is relatively small, there’s no need to make some adjustment, which means both contracts itself have certain robustness. If the influence is relatively large, the supplier should come up with new revenue-sharing contract and quantity-discount contract which have a stronger anti-disruption ability to adjust both the production plan and the pricing strategy. The new contracts can allocate the optimal supply chain between the supplier and the retailer arbitrarily. In the end, this paper compares the coordination effects, obtains the characteristics and applicable scope of the two contracts and gives numerical examples.
Keywords/Search Tags:Supply chain management, Disruption management, Revenue-sharingcontract, Quantity-discount contract, Game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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