Remanufacturing Reverse Supply Chain Based On Limited Capacity Of Inventory Facility

The rapid development of the manufacturing makes the human being have lots of material consumption, but it also brings environmental pollution and the recycling problem of resources. With the continuous improvement of the environmental awareness, and the growing improvement of the national environmental protection laws and regulations, recycling of waste products, as an important means for circular economy and sustainable development, has broad prospects for development. Therefore, the reverse supply chain has became a research area which is worthy of further exploration.In this paper, by using game theory, principal-agent theory and operations research, reverse supply chain pricing strategies and contract coordination problems are discussed under the conditions of chain members go to rent additional facilities when they do not have enough inventory facility capacity. And the discussion has certain theoretical and practical significance.Firstly, the background and present situation of reverse supply chain researches are introduced, research framework and research contents are illustrated in the beginning of the paper, and related knowledge of the reverse supply chain is summarized. Secondly, based on chain members shared rental facility costs, pricing decision-making and profit distribution of reverse supply chain are analyzed. Thirdly, with Government’s participation, a reverse supply chain model is built in view of the fact that chain member is responsible for the rental facility fee alone. And the coordination of the rebate and penalty contract is introduced to coordinate the reverse supply chain, it avoids the profit loss of the reverse double marginalization. Finally, this thesis proposes the contract coordination and information sharing in a reverse supply chain of asymmetric collection costs information. The results of the study show that:no matter the collection costs information is symmetric or not, manufacturer rents inventory facility for chain members’interests is better than the recycler does when a chain member is responsible for rental facility costs alone. No matter the collection costs information is symmetric or not, using the coordination of the rebate and penalty contract can avoid the profit loss of the reverse double marginalization. No matter the collection costs information which recycler passes to manufacturer is true or not, the recycler’s expected profit will not less than his reserved profit in symmetric information and decentralized decision making structure at least.