Study Of Some Kinds Of Supply Chain Contracts Based On Price And Inventory Game

Supply chain management has been an important management model of modern enterprises, with the development of economic globalization. Moreover, management of Supply Chain Contract got many people attention, as a part of supply chain management. In this paper, we study how supplier and retailer to adopt different strategies to design reasonable terms of Supply Contracts in order to coordinate the relationship between supplier and retailer and to maximize their expect profit in a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier and one retailer.At first we study the wholesale price-only contract of supply chain, the supplier sells products to the retailer at the wholesale price, and then the retailer sells them to the customer at retail price. In this chapter, we analysis the contract based on Stackelberg model, and we get that the retail price (order quantity) is more (less) than that under centralized supply chain, and the channel performance of the decentralized supply chain depends on the price elastic index and the cost of retailer and supplier. In the end, we also show that this supply chain can be coordinated.Then we take amazon.com as a example to study revenue sharing contract: the retailer sells product which is consigned by the supplier, the supplier decides the retail price and product quantity of the product; for each item sold, the retailer deducts a percentage from the selling price and remit the balance to the suppler. In this paper, under asymmetric information, we study the supplier and retailer's optimal equilibrium, and compare them to complete information, in which the retailer is the leader of the Stackelberg model game. The result shows that optimal revenue sharing allocation of retailer is not less than that under complete information. In the end, a numerical experiment is given to illustrate the conclusion.The competition of e-tail and retail distribution channel attracts more attention of scholars. Finally, we study the two channels advantages and shorts. Assuming the demand is random, we consider the price and inventory competitions under Bertrand and Stackelberg cases, and we obtain both equilibrium pricing policy and equilibrium stocking policy. The result show that the manufacturer will make different pricing police of the product under different conditions in the competition with retailer, which make him more stronger. The traditional retail channel will not be replaced because the value-added service only is existed in it, not in e-tail channel.