Village Banks And SMEs Loan Behavior’s Stability Research

Rural finance is the core of the modern rural economy, rura、agriculture and farmer namely "three farming" problem, is always the basic problem of China.But in recent years, due to the rural financial reform pilot failed to solve the fundamental problem of the rural finance;Rural financial services network is insufficient;Financial institutions in rural areas exist inadequate competition and large monopoly;Rural collateral development can not meet the needs of farmers and rural enterprises loan; The informal financial system is not perfect, the financing plight is always the biggest bottleneck in restricting our country to achieve fairness and efficiency. And SMEs is our country national economy’s important component, is the import force to promote China’s economic and social development.Because of asymmetric information, moral hazard exists, the lack of guarantee mechanisms, and the consequent high regulatory costs, large formal financial institutions has been stingy in providing financial support for SMEs. For rural financial financial competition is insufficient, the low coverage of financial institutions,only rely on traditional rural financial institution is unable to solve, we should develop the new rural financial institutions,village banks emerge as the times require.The existing research results fully aware of the establishment of new rural financial institutions.Also aware of the SMEs financing difficulties and causes,but lack the theoretical support,the majority only the descriptive analysis, can’t fundamentally solve the problem and provide meaningful policy recommendations. This paper adopts evolutionary game model which participation main body is limited rational.Village banks property is diveded into examinating and non-examinating type,SMEs property is diveded into honest and non-honest type,study the dynamic stable system of loan behavior.The article is divided into five chapters, the first chapter is the introduction, mainly introduces the research background, significance,and briefly introduces the framework of the thesis and point of innovation;the second chapter is literature review; the third chapter mainly introduces the background、 development of village banks’present situation and the feasibility of the evolutionary game theory;the fourth chapter is a village banks and SMEs loan research on evolutionary game, and set a specific parameter values, using MATLAB to simulate dynamic balance process; the fifth chapter is the conclusion and policy proposal part.Study finds, when we keep (non-examinating, honest)as a stable point, over a period of time, as long as there is a non-honesty SMEs,then the number of examinating villages bank will increase,only when the dishonesty SMEs proportion reduce to zero, examinating villages bank proportion will gradually reduce, so in order to reduce the total social cost government must focus of the supervision of SMEs. Just change the single main body participation of a variable for example lower loan interest rate,shorten the duration of the loan is not sufficient to reach the evolution stable strategy, we must work along both lines with government intervention, reducing rural banks and SMEs transaction cost with preferential tax and credit guarantee way. And then use the policy orientation guiding rural banks and SMEs develop healthily and stabily.