| Collaborative innovation which can integrate resources and improve the efficiency of innovation has become the important driving force of the firm and national development. Under the background of open innovation, more and more firms develop collaborative innovation through the contractual relationship, social relationship and collaborative innovation network with universities, research, government, financial institution and technology intermediary agency. This paper constructs the collaborative innovation system between government, industry, university, research, financial institution and technology intermediary and analyzes the coordinated mechanism from the perspective of game theory.First of all, the relative conception and theories of Industry-University-Research collaborative innovation are introduced, research importance is pointed out, and previous literature is summarized, all of which establish theory foundation for later research.In order to study the adjustment process of the game players’ strategy within IUR collaborative innovation and reveal the influencing factors of the strategic behavior, Chapter 3 considers the complexity in external environment and the property of dynamic evolution in the process of IUR collaborative innovation. And, the participants are assumed with limited rationality and an evolutionary game model is developed. The paper analyzes the evolutionary stability of one-sided and both sides. Theoretical reasoning and numerical tests are also conducted to analyze the influencing factors in IUR collaborative innovation. Theoretical analysis and tests results show that the probability of collaborative innovation of both sides has a positive correlation with excess income of collaboration and has a negative correlation with total cost of investment and betrayal income. There is an optimal allocation proportion of excess income which can maximize the probability of collaboration. In addition, the reasonable punishment and reward will effectively reduce the betrayal behavior of both sides.Considering characteristic like high investment, high risk, high income and asymmetric information in IUR collaboration innovation, Chapter 4 constructs a signaling model to simulate the dynamic game interaction between financial institution and technical firm during the credit activities. Study shows that there are three kinds of equilibrium including complete success, partial success and complete failure come to existence. Financial institution should actively promote the compete successful separation equilibrium to exist and avoid the partial successful combined separation equilibrium.Chapter 5 develops a principal-agent game model of relationship between the firm and technology intermediary, and studies the firm how to effective incentive technology intermediary under information symmetry and information asymmetry. Theoretical analysis shows that the firm can design a linear incentive contract to make technology intermediary have Pareto optimal effort level under information symmetry. The effort level of technology intermediary is a decreasing function of effort cost coefficient and an increasing function of comprehensive capacity level. In addition, risk aversion and exogenous uncertainties also affect the effort level of technology intermediary to some degree.The government as the main governance body of promoting economic and social development should give full play to the role of the guidance and policy support in the process of promoting IUR collaborative innovation. Chapter 6 concrete analyzes the role and the corresponding management mechanism in different stages of IUR collaborative innovation with life cycle theory.A brief summary and future research are given in Chapter 7. This study enriches the Industry-University-Research collaborative innovation theory. Meanwhile, this study provides some useful suggestions on improving the efficiency of collaborative between government, industry, university, research, financial institution and intermediary. |
