Strategy Analysis Of Government Regulation On Multinational Corporation’ S CSR Practice In China

With the rapid development of economic globalization, FDI(Foreign Direct Investment) presents a rapid increasing situation, China once becomes the favor object for Multinational Corporation. At the same time, more and more multinational corporations participate in politic, economy in the host country, and people gradually pay more attention to the corporate social responsibility problems. Especially recent years, multinational corporations have been frequently exposed existing CSR(Corporate Social Responsibility) loss phenomenons, such as product quality problem, the management defects, polluting host country environment, infringing labor rights. Supervision of multinational corporation’s CSR practice has been put on the important agenda by our government. However, because the government supervision system is not complete, not deep and not mature enough, and there are many "rent-seeking" behaviors that multinational companies bribe government supervision departments to escape from social responsibility, and the phenomenon of "two sets of standard" in the host country still exist. In view of this situation, study how to make our government supervise multinational corporations to carry out CSR effectively is very important.Based on the theory of "Market Failure", this paper introduce the government supervision into multinational corporation social responsibility research framework. Using qualitative analysis combined with comparative analysis, we construct the host country government and multinational corporation dynamic game model on the basis of qualitative analysis. Taking both complete information and incomplete information with multinational corporation’s "rent-seeking" bribery behaviors states into account, and comparing the two different expected earnings when government supervise or not, then conclude the best stratergy for host country to deal with multinational corporation.In view of the "Supervision Paradox" consideration, using Cost-Benefit curve to analyse the influnce of government supervision strength, and decide the best boundary.At last, this paper compares the advanced experience to promote corporate social responsibility among developed countries, then summarize China’s government supervision deficiencies, Thus put foward countermeasures and suggestions on how to better promote the multinational corporation social responsibility practice.Through theoretical elaboration and model building, we finally conclude following conclusions:(1) Under complete information condition, there is a positive correlation between the optimal probability for multinational corporation to carry out CSR and the host country penalty, the implementation of government supervision probability, the benefit loss result from multinational corporation fails to perform the social responsibility, and reverse to government supervision cost. The government optimal supervision probability is related to five factors, including multinational corporation’s production cost, the realizable probability of punishing and cost, the benefits when multinational corporation fails to perform CSR, and the multinational corporation discount factor.(2) Under complete information condition, only combing punishment to multinational corporation’s rent-seeking behavior with common encouragement to government supervision can spur multinational corporation to match word to deed.(3) The best state of government supervision state is the point when government regulation marginal benefit equals to marginal cost, and is affected by the depth and width of the host country government regulation.